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Abstract

ESSAYS ON SAVINGS BEHAVIOR OF LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN
COLOMBIA

by

Luz M. Salas

Advisor: Professor Jonathan Conning

I designed and implemented a Randomized Controlled Trial to study whether relatively
simple modifications to how a commitment savings product was framed and labeled could
affect savings accumulations and other outcomes of low-income individuals in newly
formed Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) in Colombia. Motivated by
hypotheses from behavioral economics, the experiment tests hypotheses that behavioral
responses should vary depending on whether subjects are led to label and create ‘mental
savings accounts’ in private or public ways. Individuals in the private-labeling treatment
groups were led to label their savings as earmarked for a particular purpose and to state
savings accumulation targets, information which was shared only privately with a member
of the research team. Individuals in the public-labeling treatment groups received the same
intervention but were then asked to publicly reveal and announce their chosen goals to
other members of their savings group. The average treatment effects of the public-labeling
iv

intervention are very strong and significant. Savings accumulations increased by an average
of 35% and savings goals were 8.5% more likely to be reached in comparison to those
untreated. Further explorations strongly suggests evidence of differentiated behavioral
responses of individuals in the private-labeling treatment group: private commitment to a
savings goal is more effective for individuals who, after random assignment but prior to the
intervention, had been measured to be less constrained by economic circumstances and
institutional barriers. The analysis and interpretation of results was enriched by mixed
methods for data collection: households’ survey data, administrative records and qualitative
data from focus groups discussions. Chapter 1 described the type of individuals that, being
offered the option, decide to participate in VSLAs. Chapters 2 and 3 show how the
interventions affect savings and other behaviors of individuals that participate in the
interventions.
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Chapter 1
1. INTRODUCTION
Savings is important to poor households. Capital and asset accumulation can help
provide poor and extremely poor households with an improved ability to generate future
income and more effectively fight poverty in the future, smooth consumption and
investment plans in the face of adverse shocks.1 Poor households save small amounts of
cash flows via informal providers such as ROSCAs and deposit collectors; or save by
holding risky assets (livestock, stored grain, durable goods).2 In all forms of microfinance,
high costs of monitoring and transaction relative to the size of the financial amounts
involved have often worked to reduce both the supply and the demand for formal financial
services or made access costly for clients.3 For this reason, innovations to bring down costs
and improve the terms and usefulness of services offered to the poor are key to expanding
service. I design and evaluate two modifications of a well-established methodology of selfhelp groups in Colombia called Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA), in order to
understand if private or public commitment through the creation and salience of ‘mental
savings accounts’, affects savings behavior. The results show that public commitment is
very effective in increasing savings and private commitment has heterogeneous behavioral
responses of treatment effects.

1

Karlan and Morduch (2009), and Burgees et al (2005).
Duflo and Banerjee (2007), Dupas and Robinson (2010), Collins et al (2009), Karlan and Murdoch (2009).
3
Karlan and Morduch, 2009; and Dupas and Robinson (2010).
2
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Recent evidence suggests that self-control problems and time inconsistent preferences
of individuals might prevent them from making optimal decisions in everyday scenarios
such as waking up early, starting a diet, doing homework, or even saving.4 As a result,
individuals often demand and rely upon commitment mechanisms to mitigate these
problems. According to Bryan at el (2010), commitment mechanisms provide individuals
with tools to help them stick to a plan that might otherwise be repeatedly postponed
because of a disparity between our long and short run intentions. Frequently, individuals’
preferences for future choices are valued disproportionately lower over current ones 5
leading to situations such as clicking the snooze button of the alarm clock or delaying our
workout one more day. As a result, individuals end up running anxious to catch the last
train and a lecture from the boss, or having to bear that back pain that have not managed to
escape from. These situations are common when making financial choices. Consequently,
savings rates and assets accumulation are often low, and this is not just the result of lack of
access to formal financial services. A commitment mechanism is something that helps us
promise our current selves to behave according to our future best interests. In the context of
under-savings, a commitment device is an arrangement used by individuals to incentivize
higher savings or penalize failure to making deposits. These rewards or penalties could be
economic (hard commitment) or psychological (soft commitment). In this study I use a soft
commitment device to evaluate how individuals respond to self-control problems associated
to savings decisions.
This study describes the design and implementation of a Randomized Controlled Trial
to evaluate if relatively simple modifications to how an existing savings product was
4
5

Laibson (1997), Angeletos et al (2001), Shefrin and Thaler (1981).
Angeletos et al (2001), Bryan et al (2010).
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framed and labeled creates a commitment mechanism and how it affects savings
accumulations and other outcomes of low-income individuals in newly formed Village
Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) in Colombia. 6 Under the existing VSLA
methodology, individuals are encouraged to save but make no explicit statement of a
commitment to reach particular savings goals. Motivated by hypotheses derived from
behavioral economics, the designed experiment explores how private- and public-labeling
alternatives in the ways in which individuals are asked to declare their savings as
earmarked for a particular purpose might affect program outcomes hypothesizing that this
might work via differences in how mental accounts are created and labeled. Individuals in
the private-labeling treatment create and label a ‘mental savings account’ and state a
savings goal privately. In the public-labeling treatment, label and state savings goals
individually but were then asked to publicly reveal and announce their chosen goals to
other members of the savings group.7 In this way individuals in both treatment groups are
able to label their ‘mental savings account’ and create private or public commitments to
reaching individual savings goals.
Behavioral economics has been increasingly accepted to be able to make predictions of
field phenomena.8 An important result in behavioral economics is that mental accounting is
a commitment mechanism that individuals use in inter-temporal decision-making in order
to constrain their own behavior.9 Mental accounting was originally defined by Richard
Thaler (1985) to be the process of mentally coding and categorizing transactions that
6

In Colombia, more than 4,500 VSLAs have been formed with over 70,000 beneficiaries up to date. The
program targets more than 5 million poor and extremely poor households registered at Red Unidos, the largest
anti-poverty intervention in the country. The global outreach of the VSLA clients is of over 8.7 million in the
five continents (Source: VSL Associates).
7
I will use the words VSLA or savings groups interchangeably.
8
Camerer et al (2004).
9
Thaler (1985).
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individuals create to mentally separate the money available make plans and keep track of
their spending. Individuals assign their available income to different expenditure accounts
and put labels such as rent, pension, entertainment, etc. This violates the classical principle
of fungibility of money in which money should not have labels attached10, thus, one should
be able to transfer money from one account to other accounts without any (implicit or
explicit) costs.
Individuals often rely upon mental accounts as a commitment device to mitigate selfcontrol problems associated with inter-temporal choices.11 For this reason, by implicitly or
explicitly categorizing mental accounts, individuals impose constraints to their behavior,
are often better able to achieve initially chosen savings goals and use financial services
more effectively to raise incomes and welfare.12 As a result, individuals may save more
when they save for a declared purpose. Relatively little evidence however has been
collected from actual field experiments to indicate how much practical and policy
importance such strategies might have on individual behavior.
Thaler (1999) argues that how mental accounts are framed, labeled and evaluated are
key components in the decision-making process. If fungibility is violated, the way in which
savings choices are framed can have significant impacts on actual savings outcomes. This
finding provides a framework for thinking about how individuals evaluate (open and close),
frame and label mental accounts in a way to maximize their utility when making financial
choices. For this reason, studying further these elements help us understand better how the
process in which mental accounts, as a commitment device, are created actually matter for

10

Thaler (1985 & 1999), Hastigs and Shapiro (2013).
Bryan et al (2010), Shefrin and Thaler (2004) and Kast and Pomeranz (2009).
12
Thaler (1985).
11
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savings decisions. The contribution of this study is to investigate if opening mental
accounts publicly, instead of privately, increases savings through additional constraints
imposed to the behavior of individuals as a result of the ‘public’ nature of commitment. A
recent field experiment by Kast et al (2012) shows that commitment is effective at
increasing savings. It uses peers as a commitment device, while this study uses mental
accounting as a commitment device to constrain savings behavior and investigates if such
accounts could be artificially created by labeling their ‘savings’ account privately or in the
presence of their peers.
The RCT randomly assigned 137 newly formed VSLA, mainly in rural areas from nine
municipalities of Colombia into two treatments and a control group. Individuals in the
control group were exposed to the standard VSLA model. 13 In the private-labeling
treatment members received an additional module with a short organized guided
conversation aimed at discussing and highlighting the difficulties of committing to a
savings path and the potential role and use of mental accounts in strengthening those
commitments. I asked participants to voluntarily state in writing a savings purpose and
weekly savings goals. This was intended to help guide individuals to form and label their
mental ‘savings’ account to privately commit to achieving that savings purpose. Goals were
not stated publicly. The public-labeling treatment was similar except that the group
discussion encouraged members to make commitments to themselves as well as to others in
their group in order to explore the possibility that this might lead to different outcomes. As
in the private-labeling treatment members were asked to voluntarily state a savings purpose
13

Members of the VSLA meet every two weeks to make contributions to a self-managed and self-capitalized
savings fund by purchasing shares of the fund. In addition to savings individuals are able to take small loans
on terms set by the group at interest rates that are typically much lower than available from other sources. The
duration of the savings cycle is from 8 to 9 months at the end of which the funds are distributed according
each individual’s accumulated shares.

5

and weekly savings goals in writing, but in this intervention, those commitments were
shared with all members of the group. By doing this, individuals explicitly label their
‘mental savings account’ and publicly commit to their own decision. Prior to the public
announcement, individuals were not informed about the (public) nature of the treatment or
their commitment.14 This module included a trust building game and a guided conversation
aimed at highlighting the achievements of group commitments.15
With the experimental design I studied how labeling mental accounts in a social
environment (publicly) gives rise to higher savings rates, to higher achievement of savings
goals and to changes in non-savings outcomes, in comparison to labeling mental accounts
privately. Public commitment of savings goals creates implicit agreements that may affect
or even change the behavior of some members of a group.16 The anticipation of “social
punishment”, in the form of a shame act or harm to reputation acts as a mechanism to
induce individuals to save more and achieve their commitments more often. As a result,
higher savings balances and goal achievement rates in the public-labeling treatment group
support this idea because individuals fear breaking commitments made to other members of
the group more than commitments made only to themselves.
If money were fungible or perfectly substitutable, the marginal propensity to consume
ought to be the same out of all sources of income and assigning labels to specific
expenditures or accounts would not have any impact on how the money is spent.

14

Although individuals seemed shy when the experimenter invited to share their commitments, 100% of those
in the treatment intervention decided to share it with other members of the group.
15
The trust building activity played at the beginning of the public-labeling treatment is called “Game with
balloons”. One balloon was distributed to each member of the VSLA and they were challenged to push the
balloon up and keep it in the air. Once they were able to hold them up in the air, I added more balloons, so
that each participant had to keep an eye not only on their own balloon but also on the balloons of the others.
The purpose of the game was to build a cooperative environment within members of the VSLA.
16
Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Carpenter et al, 2010.
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Individuals would just transfer money from, say, the ‘rent’ account to the ‘leisure’ account
without imposing any psychological or monetary costs.17 If this were the case, labeling
savings accounts (privately or even publicly) would not affect individual’s savings and
non-savings decisions in the experimental sample. On the other hand, the classical approach
to decision-making under uncertainty assumes a self-interested behavior of individuals.
Therefore, choices should not be unaffected by other people’s decisions (neglecting any
motivation of reciprocity and fairness that induce cooperation and enhances group oriented
behavior). If this were the case, social networks wouldn’t be relevant for decision-making
and individuals in the public-labeling treatment will not make any additional effort to
achieve their savings goals or to change the behavior related to discretionary spending, food
security, etc. and therefore, savings rates would be the same as in the other experimental
groups.
However, the results demonstrate very significant and strong results for treated
individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings increased by an average of 35%
(effect size of up to .38 standard deviations) and individuals were 8.5% more likely to
achieve the initially established savings goals. The results for the private-labeling treatment
intervention are heterogeneous. The quantitative and qualitative data indicates that such
heterogeneity comes from intrinsic ability to save of individuals and on institutional
features of the VSLA methodology that impose restrictions on individual savings behavior.
In sum, treatment effects are very significant for individuals who are less economically
constrained in their ability to save and insignificant for individuals that are less able to save,
even prior to the intervention. This uncovers the fact that individuals experience different

17

Thaler (1999), Hastigs and Shapiro (2013).
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abilities to respond to the treatment interventions and must be considered in the analysis.
The results are robust to different specifications, as described in more detail below.
The estimations of the impact of these interventions on non-savings behavioral
responses of individuals participating in VSLA groups in Colombia suggest an increase in
the reported levels of trust in relatives and friends, changed participants' perceptions of
happiness and safety in the neighborhood and led to reductions in discretionary spending of
some expenses; but did little to affect many other decisions within the household or
perceptions of food insecurity.
I used mixed methods for data analysis at different stages of the research project.
During July to November of 2011 I administered a baseline survey to 670 individuals from
the experimental sample to measure a set of characteristics and choices prior to their
exposure to the treatments. The second-stage surveying was administered in the fall of
2012, when I followed-up the same group of individuals interviewed at baseline. I also use
administrative records of 1,663 members of the VSLA gathered from two organization
which I worked with: IED/Vital and Plan International. Finally, I collected qualitative data
from focus group discussions to gather information about the experience and perspectives
of participants in the study.
The survey explores demographic information of the households, as well as nutrition,
health, income, work related activities, expenditures, experience with financial services,
among others. I use these data along with qualitative data to describe the type of individuals
that, being offered, decide to participate in a VSLA.
The intervention translates recent theoretical insights into experimental strategies
implemented in the field to both test the theory and possibly improve the impacts of a
8

large-scale public policy program. The experimental design contributes to the
understanding of how different strategies used to create mental accounts affect choices and
contributes to the growing literature in behavioral economics and microfinance. The
methodology represents a new approach to the study of individual behavior and provides
valuable insights and information to program administrators and policy makers involved in
the design and diffusion of commitment-savings products. The increased availability of
these and other products with similar features may serve to increase savings, improve
financial literacy amongst poor households, which may contribute to generate income to
fight poverty.

9

Chapter 2
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In a recent popular press book, which summarizes findings from a body of work,
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2009) explain how to move people in a preferred
direction by providing “nudges” to their decision-making process. They describe a series of
field experiments in which the so-called “choice architects” construct a “choice
environment” 18 that influence the decisions of individuals in a certain direction. An
example of this is the voluntary retirement savings plans (SMarT) created to increase
savings rates of workers by setting default choices (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004).
A still small but fast expanding body of theory and evidence has focused attention on
how behavioral economics might affect the design of microfinance products and how
economists think about household pathways out of poverty. A recent survey by Bryan,
Karlan and Nelson (2010) points out some theoretical and empirical concerns about the
design and implementation of commitment devices. They discuss the effectiveness of
different types of products and different types of individuals in determining the demand of
commitment devices, and the ability to generate long run impacts on the behavior of its
clients (Bryan et al., 2010). Commitment is an important tool that is able to help individuals
to stick to the plan that is constantly delayed because the valuation of present choices is

18

Choice environments are defined by setting starting points, incentives or defaults that draw the attention of
individuals toward better choices.
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much larger to the valuation of future choices.19 In other words, a demand for commitment
is created when individuals cannot reconcile present with future decisions. In a series of
papers, Karna Basu studies take up rates, sustainability and welfare impacts of informal
savings products for individuals with different types of preferences (Basu, 2008, 2010 and
2011). Individuals with time inconsistent preferences obtain commitment products in order
to deal with the conflict between present and future decisions. Richard Thaler (1980) also
establishes “pre-commitment” as an alternative to solve self-control problems for activities
with a time dimension (i.e. consumption and investment).20 In this study, I designed and
implemented an intervention that offered a soft commitment device to encourage
participants of VSLAs to create and label a ‘mental savings account’, privately and
publicly, in order to increase savings.
The following studies provide evidence from the field on different types of
commitment products. In a randomized field trial, Ashraf et al (2006) found that
sophisticated hyperbolic discounters (more likely to commit) were actually more likely to
open restricted access savings accounts and to hold a higher level of deposits. Other studies
show that small variations in product design can increase uptake and savings. In the
Philippines, Dean Karlan and others evaluated other types of commitment products that
mitigate the “limited attention” problem of under-savings. Using an RCT they found that
sending text message with gain or loss oriented reminders affected their savings goals.
These experiments were repeated in similar setting in Bolivia and Peru.

19

Individuals with such preferences are called “hyperbolic discounters”, present bias or time inconsistent. See
Rabin and O’Donoghue (1997). See also Laibson (1997).
20
See also Mullainathan (2006).
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Dupas and Robinson (2009) found an increase in productive investment and
consumption as a result of an RCT in which they offered clients to pay fees and minimum
balance to entrepreneurs in Kenya. In another study (2010) the same authors measured the
impact of a savings product on changes in consumption and investment rates. They found
that opening interest-free bank accounts increased savings rates, investment level, private
expenditures among entrepreneur women, and found them to be less vulnerable to illness
shocks. Bertrand et al (2005) and Bertrand et al (2006) provide excellent discussions of the
role of psychology on the behavior of economic decisions in the credit market for the poor.
The first study argues the ability of frames and signals to induce behavior among loan
clients. They found that incorporating psychology features (such as offers framed in loss vs.
gain contexts) into lender's offers resulted more effective than standard monetary
incentives, such as lower interest rates or longer repayment periods.
Another way of dealing with self-control problems of individual behavior is mental
accounting (Thaler, 1985). The concept of creating or categorizing mental accounts as a
commitment device has been tested in some experimental settings in the microfinance
agenda. “Mental accounting matters” for the consumption, savings and investment
decisions of all individuals (Thaler, 1999). A growing theoretical literature, as well as
evidence from the lab and field suggests that individuals often rely upon mental accounts as
a commitment device to respond to self-control problems associated with inter-temporal
decision-making. Mental accounting allows individuals to mentally separate the money
available, make plans and track expenses. As a result, mental accounting may change
consumption and expenditure habits to smooth consumption and it may even increase
savings. Financial decisions are influenced by the way in which mental accounts are created

12

and evaluated. The decision-making process may depend on the scope and framing of
mental accounts and the period of time in which they are evaluated (Soman, 2004). For this
reason it is important to study all these elements of how mental accounts are formed in
order to better understand how they actually matter. If mental accounting matters, it implies
that the classical principle of fungibility of money is violated (Thaler, 1999; Shefrin and
Thaler, 2004; Hastigs and Shapiro, 2013), and individuals do not, in fact, transfer money
from one account to other accounts without any costs, use budgets and make plans to how
to assign money to specific accounts.
Kast et al (2012) evaluate the use of peers as a commitment device in two field
experiments among micro-entrepreneurs in Chile. The study implemented two experiments.
The first experiment tests whether peer pressure acts as a commitment device to encourage
savings among microcredit clients that meet regularly to make repayments to their jointly
liable loan. The second experiment adds to the reminders through text messages to
unbundle the mechanism behind the peer pressure effects on savings. The intervention is
successful in demonstrating that microentrepreneurs save more as a result of their
participation in the self-help peer group. However, the authors show that the change in
savings behavior is not necessarily related to the in-person meetings common in self-help
groups, but in regular follow-ups, present in those. The effect of sending regular text
messages to participants is as effective as in-person meetings.
Bertrand et al (2006) analyses two features of mental accounting: labeling and setting
defaults. By setting defaults or “irrelevant starting points” financial institutions and
governments can increase the participation of the poor in financial services and improve
welfare. Second, labeling accounts help individuals spend their savings in what they

13

initially planned. By assigning labels or specific names to certain accounts individuals will
be less likely to spend it in something else (i.e. temptation goods).21
I framed the experimental design in the context of labeling and categorizing mental
accounts privately and publicly and measures its effects on investment and savings
decisions and other outcomes. I evaluate whether labeling mental accounts in a social
environment gives rise to higher savings rates and to higher achievement of savings goals
in comparison to the privately created accounts. Public commitment of savings goals
creates implicit agreements that may affect or even change the behavior of some members
of a group.22 Individuals who participate in collective interactions value other people's
opinions and use them in their own decision-making process. The creation of an implicit
agreement among subjects in the public-labeling treatment group imposes informal (nonmonetary) sanctions or rewards on the behavior of others that motivates the enforcement of
such agreements and helps stick to their initial plan. Similar to Kast et al (2012), this study
shows that the in-person meetings are powerful in promoting higher savings rates.
However, in this case, the implicit agreement created within the savings group is the
mechanism by which behavior is changed. Although the two studies aim to prove the
effectiveness of commitments devices linked to peer pressure, in particular savings goals,
this study incorporates labeling savings goals or mental accounts and is able to separately
identify the peer mechanism that gives rise to higher savings rates. The effect of putting
labels to accounts allows transferring money to less tempting accounts, in addition to

21

Shefrin and Thaler model of behavioral life cycle defines a hierarchy for mental accounts (consumption,
wealth and income) from more to less tempting. By making individuals transfer money to less tempting
accounts will achieve higher savings rates.
22
Gächter and Fehr (1999), Fehr and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) and Carpenter et al (2010).
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creating commitment and mentally categorizing expenses, as mental accounting has proven
to be effective.
Others describe the effect of social relations on the effectiveness of contract
enforcement in group-oriented behavior. Theoretical as well as empirical findings
contradict the pure self-interested behavior assumption and predict that fairness and
reciprocity motivations enhance collective actions and therefore induce the enforcement of
social norms. Social interactions achieve higher levels of cooperation among individuals.23
Also, Masclet et al (2006) finds that informal sanctions that affect non-monetary payoffs
motivate cooperation if monetary payoffs are unaffected. This result is reinforced by the
findings of Carpenter et al (2006) in which reciprocity motivates mutual monitoring and
attenuates contracting problems associated with imperfect information. Barr (2001)
validates the effectiveness of social sanctions in inducing cooperation, in particular when
there is some level of “familiarity” among members of the group.24
In the microfinance agenda, a large body of evidence shows that poor households use
informal financial services to smooth consumption, start up new businesses, save to
purchase a durable good, or finance festivals and other events. Collins et al (2009) find that
a relatively large portion of household incomes in Bangladesh, India and South Africa
flows through financial products. Poor households use different informal savings products
(self-help groups, ROSCAs and other providers) but they might be inadequate. Holding
livestock or durable goods might be too risky because animals may die and goods may
break, in which case savings are lost. Also, real returns on savings are often negative
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Fehr et al (1997), Fehr and Schmidt (2007), Fehr and Gächter (2000), Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), Gächter
and Fehr (1999).
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This result was also obtained by Gächter and Fehr (1999), Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Carpenter et al
(2010). The later study makes several predictions about the effect of various degrees of connectedness on
cooperative behavior, in a lab setting.
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because the interest paid on deposits is usually zero and in many cases they have to pay a
deposit fee;25 and some people borrow money from one provider to be able to deposit a
specific amount in a savings account or in a savings group.26
Informal financial contracting is common in developing countries, where the supply of
financial products is limited. Poor households save small amounts of cash flows that are too
costly to collect for formal providers as well as for savers. This might reduce the effective
use of financial products to these people and their ability to manage and accumulate assets.
Even though bank accounts are offered, it is still costly to poor households to deposit their
savings. Bank branches are usually far away from their homes or workplace, in particular in
rural areas, where the cost of transportation is sometimes higher than the amount deposited.
Besides transaction costs associated with the use of financial services, managing
financial products is difficult. Individuals lack the willpower to reconcile present and future
decisions. Decisions that involve a time dimension may require immediate costly actions
that individuals postpone, leading to suboptimal decisions.27 This is the case of savings.
People are aware that anticipating costs by reducing the consumption of temptation goods
today may lead to benefits in the future. Even extremely poor households save and can
often choose to save more by reducing the consumption of temptation goods (alcohol,
tobacco, coffee and tea) and social or religious events. 28 However, the value that
individuals impose on the delayed gratification of saving today sometimes is lower than the
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For further discussion see Ashraf et al (2006).
This seems to be a common practice among women who participate in Spandana, a Micro Finance
Institution that provides financial services to individuals in poor villages from India, which helps solve selfcontrol problems. Banerjee and Duflo (2011), Chapter 8 pp 196-197.
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Basu (2009) explains how different types of individuals with time inconsistent preferences may
“renegotiate'” with themselves in order to reach a different equilibrium.
28
According to Duflo and Banerjee (2007, 2011) 56% to 78% of poor and extremely poor households' income
is spent in food. However, a large amount is spent in the consumption of temptation goods (alcohol, tobacco),
celebrations and festivals. This is also discussed in Dupas and Robinson (2010).
26
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cost associated with reducing consumption today. This is particularly true for individuals
with limited and unstable incomes, who disproportionately spend a larger fraction of their
income on the consumption of unnecessary (temptation) goods and for whom saving
becomes harder than for wealthier individuals.29
This reveals a demand for commitment products for time inconsistent clients,
especially designed for the poor to increase access to credit markets. Expanding financial
access can help the poor increase saving and investment in productive activities and allow
them to take advantage of new opportunities. For example, Dupas and Robinson (2010)
provided evidence that a campaign to increase take-up rates of interest-free accounts led to
accumulation of productive investments and an increase in income for women
entrepreneurs in Kenya.
Designing and offering commitment savings products contributes to improving the
financial capability of individuals and wellbeing, by increasing savings, empowering in
their ability to manage and accumulate assets, smoothing consumption, improving their
ability to cope with unexpected shocks, developing financial literacy and improving intertemporal consumption decisions. Innovations to bring down costs and improve the terms
and usefulness of services offered are therefore the key to expanding service. However, the
design and impact evaluation of new innovative commitment devices to this population
remains a relatively new and under-studied topic in the microfinance agenda. Product
innovations might work to expand financial access to help the poor manage their income
and asset accumulation strategies at a lower cost.
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Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) and Karlan (2010) discuss this issue and its implications for the take-up
of commitment savings products. Also, Banerjee and Duflo (2011) provide evidence of how individuals
declare spending too much of their incomes in these types of goods.

17

Chapter 3: Who joins VSLAs?
3.1.

INTRODUCTION

Savings is important to poor households. Capital and asset accumulation can help
provide poor and extremely poor households with an improved ability to generate future
income and more effectively fight poverty in the future and smooth consumption.30 Poor
households save small amounts of money by stashing cash at home or via informal
providers such as ROSCAs and deposit collectors; or save by holding risky assets
(livestock, stored grain and durable goods).31 Although the risks associated with these
forms of savings, it is more convenient or even cheaper than making deposits in a formal
financial institution. High costs of monitoring and transaction relative to the size of the
financial amounts involved have often worked to reduce both the supply and the demand
for formal financial services or made access costly for clients.32
Informal financial contracting is common in developing countries, where the supply of
financial products is limited, particularly in rural areas. Also, poor households save small
amounts of cash flows that are too costly to collect by formal providers and too costly to
deposit for savers. But besides transaction costs associated with the use of financial
services, managing financial products is difficult. Individuals lack the willpower to
reconcile present and future decisions. Decisions that involve a time dimension may require
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Karlan and Morduch (2009), and Burgees et al (2005).
Duflo and Banerjee (2007), Dupas and Robinson (2010), Collins et al (2009), Karlan and Murdoch (2009).
32
Karlan and Morduch (2009); and Dupas and Robinson (2010).
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immediate costly actions that individuals postpone, leading to suboptimal decisions. In the
case of savings individuals have to anticipate costs by reducing the consumption of
temptation goods today, expecting a benefit in the future. However, the cost of forfeiting
consumption today is often larger than the gratification of being able to face an unexpected
shock in the future. This is particularly true for individuals with volatile income, who spend
a larger fraction of their income in the consumption of unnecessary (sometimes called,
temptation) goods and for whom saving becomes a major challenge.
For this reason, innovations to bring down costs and improve the terms and usefulness
of services, formal or informal, offered to the poor are key to expanding service. Access to
these arrangements helps them manage and accumulate assets, as well as smooth
consumption to be able to confront unexpected shocks that may prevent them to fight
poverty successfully.
In this essay I explore the characteristics of individuals that decide to join Village
Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA). VSLAs are informal arrangements offered to poor
and vulnerable households in developing countries that bring access to financial services
such as savings and loans. Individuals self-select to join a VSLA and make contributions to
a self-managed savings fund by purchasing shares of the savings fund in regular meetings
(weekly or biweekly).
I use quantitative data collected from the baseline survey of the impact evaluation of
the VSLA program in Colombia. The survey gathered information from 2,292 households:
1,207 participant households located in municipalities where the program currently
operates and 1,085 control households located in municipalities without the program. I use
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information for the participant households only with the purpose of characterizing the type
of households that, being offered the opportunity to participate, decide to join a VSLA.33
The analysis is enriched with qualitative data collected from 4 focus groups
discussions that I conducted with a sample of participants in VSLAs. In these sessions, I
explore the perceptions of participants in VSLAs after some time of exposure to the
program. I investigate the motivations to joining a VSLA and their experience during the
first savings cycle (approximately 8 months). The discussions provide evidence about the
effectiveness of the VSLA methodology in promoting savings as a result of the implicit
agreements generated inside each savings group. The group-oriented behavior acts as a
mechanism to change individual behavior toward the achievement of larger savings rates.
For this reason, the VSLA methodology could be disseminated as a commitment product to
increase the financial capability of vulnerable households.

3.2.

VILLAGE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS

VSLA are community based savings commitment products, built on the ROSCA
model and other self-help savings groups as an alternative to formal microfinance that
offers access to insurance, savings and small loans to the poor with limited or non access to
formal financing.34 Individuals self-select and participate in a voluntary basis to form a selfmanaged and self-capitalized fund to save and borrow periodically. Members make small
and regular contributions to the savings fund by purchasing up to 5 shares in each meeting.
33

The impact evaluation is being funded by the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Interamerican
Development Bank. The program is operated by Coprporacion IED-Vital.
34
Over the last 3 decades, the VSL methodology has been implemented by anti-poverty organizations such as
CARE, Oxfam America, Plan International and others, in different countries, namely: India, Bangladesh,
many African countries and recently, in some Latin American countries. For more information visit VSL
Associates. http://vsla.net/
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Savings are invested in a fund that is soon used to provide small, short-term loans to
participants, used for consumption, making small investments in their businesses, and
emergencies. In addition, the group contributes a small but equal amount of money in every
meeting to constitute the social fund, which can be used as insurance in the form of grants
for fatalities and other unexpected circumstances. The purchase of shares takes place in
biweekly meetings with all members of the group and is recorded in a passbook. Each
member owns a passbook to record transaction. Funds are securely stored in the safe box
and kept by one member of the group until the next meeting. In Colombia, VSLA are
formed by up to 19 members, usually neighbors, friends or family.
The VSLA has a structured methodology and a set of rules that members establish in
the first “training” meeting, before starting making contributions to the savings fund. All
members of the group form a General Assembly, which elects a Management Committee
consisting of 5 positions (chairperson, record-keeper, box-keeper, and 2 money-counters).
The General Assembly sets the rules and conditions stated in a constitution of the fund that
every member must agree and sign. The constitution contains information of rules of
governance, dispute and resolution, conditions for purchase of shares, uses of the social
fund, interest rates and the price of a share. There is a limit in the number of share
purchased in each meeting. Each member cannot purchase more than 5 shares per meeting.
However, occasionally, the group allows extraordinary purchase of shares by all members
or sometimes the group purchases additional shares using money from group activities such
as selling food at a fair, raffles, etc. The price of shares, interest rates on loans, contribution
to the social fund and other rules are defined prior to the first purchase of shares, and are
maintained throughout the savings cycle. This methodology helps households to manage
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their cash flows and be able to accumulate larger amounts of money for multiple purposes.
At the end of the savings cycle (approximately 8 months), the fund is closed and the
accumulated savings are distributed according to the shareholdings.
In 2008, Banca de las Oportunidades, a national government agency created to
promote access to financial services to the unbanked population, launched a pilot of the
program Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA) in 34 municipalities. The VSLA
methodology has been implemented in at least 30 developing countries around the globe
and has proven to be effective in providing savings and loan services to local communities
that have not access to formal services. To date, VSLA has almost reached 9 million clients
worldwide. 35 Preliminary results from the pilot in Colombia show that individuals
consistently save small amounts of money. It reached almost 7,000 clients with an average
savings of USD 78 over an 8 to 9 months period. Loans were on average of USD 67 each
and less that 25% of participants took a loan, at least in the first savings cycle.36 The
successful experience of the pilot program motivated the expansion of this initiative to
other regions in the country. In June 2011, the government started the expansion to
organize 600 new VSLA in cities and rural areas with high poverty levels and limited
access to formal financial services. Since 2013, the government and other multilateral
organizations are funding the promotion of the program in more regions of the country and
are planning to form over 2,000 new VSLAs. The funding organizations and governmental
institutions jointly chose the municipalities where the program operates according the
following criteria: (i) large percentage of population under the national poverty line; (ii)
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VSLA Global Outreach report. Hugh Allen, October, 2013.
Banca de las Oportunidades report, VSLA pilot proyect, January, 2011. VSLAs are commonly operated by
CARE, Oxfam America and Plan International, and many other local organizations. In Colombia are mostly
operated by IED/Vital and Plan International.
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low access to formal financial institutions (measured by presence of banks and other
financial institutions); and (iii) geographical location (easily accessible). In each of these
sites, field operators have different recruitment and socialization strategies, using the local
authorities and religious institutions, agents of Red Unidos or even visiting different
neighborhoods by word of mouth many members join a saving group. In the design of the
program, 60% of the target population was members of Red Unidos, but once the program
launched its expansion and the data collection took place, we could confirm that this
percentage was not larger than 30%.37 In other words, less than 30% of the VSLA members
belong to Red Unidos. In any case, this does not mean that members of VSLAs are not poor
or vulnerable. Individuals that join the program are mostly self-employed with variable
incomes and have different types of vulnerabilities. In the next section I describe in more
detail the situation of the VSLA members.

3.3.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA

In the following analysis, I use data from the baseline survey collected in the spring of
2013 for the impact evaluation of the VSLA program in Colombia. The study surveyed the
household of individuals that participate in VSLAs (participants), and households of
individuals that live in municipalities where the VSLA does not operate (control). I will
only use data from the sample of participants, which randomly chose 7 households from
37

Red Unidos is the largest Colombian governmental anti-poverty initiative that offers households priority
access to the supply of social programs. In the component of banking and financial inclusion the network
works with other government agencies to provide specialized financial mechanisms linked to transfer
payments including savings, microcredit and micro-insurance. The network aims to help 16 million people
who live under the national poverty line and 5.3 million under the extreme poverty line. These numbers
represent 32.7% and 10.6% of the Colombian population in 2012. Source: Departamento Administrativo
Nacional de Estadistica -- DANE. Currently, Red Unidos has enrolled 1.5 million families (1.2 million
classified by the SISBEN index as extremely poor, and 300 thousand displaced from violence).
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each VSLA created in the expansion of the program in 2013 in 7 states: Bolivar (280),
Boyaca (149), Cauca (107), Choco (90), Cundinamarca (177), La Guajira (228) and Nariño
(176).
The survey collected data about: general characteristics of all members of the
household such as education, age, marital status, etc., health, nutrition, housing
(conditions), income and occupation, businesses, assets and land holdings, transfers,
remittances, investments, expenditures, use of financial services, shocks, social networks,
loans, social capital and domestic violence. I use some of the observed characteristics of the
household for the analysis.
Also, I use data from the first wave of the Colombian Longitudinal Study of Wealth,
Income, Labor and Land from Los Andes University (ELCA 2010) in order to compare the
situation of an average household in the country, in rural and urban areas. The sample is
composed of 10,000 households (6,000 urban and 4,000 rural) and its representative of
Colombian households from socioeconomic strata 1 through 4 and 5 geographical regions.
It contains economic and social information about Colombian households, such as income,
employment, education, property ownership, health, family composition, etc.38

3.4.

WHAT TYPES OF HOUSEHOLDS JOIN A VSLA?

In this section I describe the characteristics of the individuals and composition of their
households from the VSLA sample and provide comparisons using the national average,
rural and urban averages from the ELCA 2010. Table 1 summarizes the findings.
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a. Household characteristics
Respondents of the VSLA survey are women in more than 80% of the sample with an
average of 37 years of age. 65% household heads are men and 70% have a spouse or
partner that lives in the house. According to the information reported in the total sample,
the size of a household is of about 4.2 individuals, typically with 2 children living at home.
A typical household at the national level and in urban areas has a similar size, but in rural
areas households are commonly larger, in particular because they have on average 1 child
more at home. See Table 1.
Although the program targets poor and extremely poor individuals, only 26% of the
sample belongs to Red Unidos, the largest anti-poverty initiative in the country. Despite this
number, participants in VSLAs belong to households with high levels of vulnerability.
Their homes are located in disadvantaged neighborhoods with very low conditions and
more 50% of households are recipients of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) from the
program Mas Familias en Accion, which provides incentives for school attendance, health
and nutrition checkups. At the national level, only 1.67% of households are enrolled in Red
Unidos, but a third of the Colombian population receives CCTs from Mas Familias en
Accion. This numbers are larger in rural areas, where the level of poverty is larger.
In the second panel of Table 1, I present the level of education for all members of the
household. In terms of school achievement, 45% of the study sample completed elementary
education, while the national level reaches 48.11%, in urban areas this fraction is around
one third and in rural areas reaches two thirds of the population. On the other hand, the
percentage of high school graduates is 24% for a typical VSLA household and 32.28% at
the national level; with a larger percentage of individuals completing high school in urban
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areas is much larger in comparison with rural areas (44.22% and 19.72%, respectively).
Lastly, the number of individuals that completed college is very small in all samples. Only
3.2% of individuals in a VSLA household have a college degree. At the national level this
number reaches 2.9%, mostly driven by individuals in urban areas.

b. Housing
Near 90% of households that were interviewed in the study live in a house or
apartment, and the percentage of homeowners is surprisingly large: 56% of respondents
own their home. From these, only a small percentage is still paying for it. Among the
financing options are reported: savings (39.4%%), inheritance (19.6%) and subsidies
(around 6.4%). In a smaller proportion, households have used loans from financial
institutions or employees (7.6%). On the other hand, approximately 25% of households in
the study pay rent and around 20% live in the property without paying anything, although
are not owners (see Tables 1 and 2). Homeownership for an average household in
Colombia is much lower (49.24%) being households in the rural areas more often owners
than in urban areas.
Despite the large percentage of homeownership among surveyed households, their
living conditions are relatively poor. Most of them sleep in one or 2 bedrooms and the
quality of walls, floors and ceilings is not always appropriate. As shown in Table 2, walls
are mostly built from brick, stone or blocks, sometimes unpainted, floors are usually
unfinished and made of gravel or cement, or sometimes made of brick, tile or tablets. But a
large percentage of households have their floors made of soil or sand, especially in rural
areas, where this happens in 30.27% of the time. In urban areas the quality of floors is
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normally better. On the other hand, the material of the ceilings is predominantly wood,
brick or clay tile, and iron sheets or zinc. Often the materials seem good enough, but are
either unfinished or in a bad shape. For that reason it is common to see in the patio piles of
bricks, cement or clay tiles to make renovations and improvements to their homes. When
individuals are asked for those materials they often say that is the way they use their
savings and until the materials are complete, they do not start the renovations.
In terms of sources of fuel for cooking, most households use natural gas connected to
the public network or propane gas from a cylinder. Very few households use electricity,
mineral coal, oil or petrol; but 23% use firewood or charcoal. The latter is more common in
rural areas where houses are more isolated. Water for cooking and drinking usually comes
from a public system or community aqueduct. In over 15%, it comes from a public pile or
tanker and less than 10% from rainwater collection. For an average household in the
country this is less common, especially if the household lives in an urban area. Sanitary
conditions are relatively decent. 90% of households have access to a sewage system or
septic tank. However, in 7% of the households don’t have access to a toilet.

c. Health and food security
Table 3 describes the affiliation to health insurance, episodes of illness and food
insecurity for the surveyed households members of VSLAs. At least three quarters of the
population belong to the subsidized regime, while 21% of the individuals surveyed make
contributions to obtain a health insurance, generally through their employers. A small
percentage of the sample reported having received a medical service in the month previous
to the survey. In those cases, the person with the illness missed school or work for at least 5
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days and paid medical expenses for an average of USD 35 in the month previous to the
survey.
In terms of food insecurity, the last panel of Table 3 shows that some households
struggle every day to consume an appropriate amount of food. 14.1% and 8.4% of
households reported insufficient food intake of an adult or children in the 30 days prior to
the survey. More than 15% reported having difficulties to get enough food for the
household. They had to reduce the amount of food or consumed less than 3 meals a day as a
result of lack of money. Despite the larger percentage of households with this difficulty, the
average number of days that this happened was over 9 in the last 30 days. In addition, the
number of meals that the respondent consumed the day prior to the interview was 2.7 on
average. In these situations, most households turn to their relatives, neighbors or friends for
help and in less than 10% of the cases, take small loans from an informal lender or defer
payments at the local grocery store. The social networks created in the VSLA allow
individuals to mitigate such problems that often occur.

d. Job related activities
In terms of types of occupation and job-related activities, the data show that 42.30% of
adults in VSLA survey work in a paid job. This number is similar for the average national,
mostly because in urban areas the fraction of adults in a paid job is pretty high (close to
70%). In rural areas, less than 30% of adults are employed in a paid activity (see panel C of
Table 1). Among those employed, approximately one third of the VSLA sample is selfemployed, one third works in the private sector, 15% work in farming and the remaining
work either in the public sector, as domestic worker or in other type of non-farming job. At
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the national level, more than 40% of adults in the labor force work in self-employed
activities and a similar proportion work in the private sector. Less than 10% of employed
individuals work for the public sector. A similar situation s observed in urban and rural
areas among adults that are in employed in a paid job. Those who did not have any paid job
in the 30 days prior to the survey spent their time mostly: attending school exclusively
(24%), doing household chores (25%), mostly young individuals and women, respectively;
or taking care of other individuals in the household (less than 1%).
In the case of household heads, 74% of them worked in a paid job during 30 days prior
to the VSLA survey (Table 4). Household heads worked more frequently in paid jobs, but a
smaller portion (15%) spent their time doing household chores, worked in a family related
activity without payment (2.6%), attended school (1%), took care of other members of the
family (0.3%), is retired (3%) or disabled to work (1.4%). See Panel A of Table 4.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, more than 30% of individuals work in a selfemployed activity. In terms of the type of business or enterprises, households report
working in commercial activities (mostly catalog sales) or services (shoes and clothing
repair, transportation and others) in 29% and 26%, respectively. The food industry such as
selling prepared food in the market and fairs, or selling snacks and candy achieves 17% of
the sample. Other activities such as arts and crafts, and mining are reported in
approximately 5% of the sample, while 11% of the cases have a business in the farming and
fishery industry. See Figure 1. According to the reports in the survey, these businesses are
in general profitable, with profit of 42.8% of sales. However, we cannot determine what
types of expenditures are being considered in the calculations reported by respondents (see
Table 5). It is common among these business individuals not to include a salary for
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themselves or to fund those with household income (some expenses are shared with
households expenses such as electricity or water). If those expenses were taken into
account, profit would have been lower. The average sales in these businesses are USD 367
per month. If the profits reported were correct, a household of 4 individuals could not live
with an income of USD 150 – USD 200. For that reason, other members of the family
besides the household head have to engage in income generating activities in order to pay
the household expenditures. In a subsequent section, I describe in more detail household
expenditures. Finally, not all businesses have profit of 42%. It varies by industry and type
of activity. For example, businesses such as shoe repair, carpentry and other services
reported having profit of over 60% of sales, while farming, fishery, mechanic and
transportation had profit of less than 20%. These numbers also vary by location. Some
businesses are more profitable in the Caribbean while others are more profitable in the
countryside.

e. Assets, durables, animals and land ownership
Table 6 summarizes the ownership of assets, durable goods and animals for the sample
of participants. The survey asked respondents if someone in the household owns any of the
categories listed in the table. In terms of assets, most households have the basic home needs
such as a bed and mattress, TV, and kitchen supplies. In a smaller portion, individuals own
kitchen appliances and furniture (30% to 80%), electronics (8.5% have a microwave, 6.8%
a camera or video camera, 35.5% a music player, 42.5% a DVD player, 16.7% a computer
for home use exclusively), etc. For transportation, 35% of respondents have a bike, 19% a
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motorbike and 6,7% a car. However, these are not for exclusive use of the family. In some
cases they are used to run the business.
Although many of these households reside in rural areas, the proportion that has tools
for agricultural activities is very small. Only 41% and 43% of households own a shovel or
machete, respectively. This is consistent with the low percentage of farming workers in the
sample. Finally, animal ownership is also rare. 8.2% of households have cattle, 8.1% report
having pigs, while 19.6% have chickens in their residence. These numbers suggest that
households living in rural areas use these tools and animals for small-scale farming or for
household consumption.

f. Household expenditures
Figure 2 shows the composition of household expenditures reported by individuals. I
calculated the monthly expenditure and classified the reported items into the following
categories: (i) basic consumption: food and groceries (including cleaning products),
utilities, transportation and clothing; (ii) education expenses: tuition and fees, uniforms,
books and materials, transportation and pocket money for children; (iii) housing: rent and
any home improvements or repairs; and (iv) non-basic consumption expenditures: includes
the purchase of durables and home appliances, entertainment, travel, lotteries, alcohol and
tobacco and social events and celebrations. About 70% of household monthly expenses are
allocated to basic consumption, in particular food, 17% to housing, followed by about 9%
to education and around 5% to the consumption of other items.
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Although the participation of non-basic consumption or discretionary spending is not
large, the survey asked households if they had any unnecessary or “discretionary” spending.
I am interested in this question because in many cases to engage in a commitment saving
product like the VSLA, an individual may redistribute all sources of income into
consumption and savings. The data show that 87% of individuals acknowledged that
consumption could be reduced in at least one of the listed categories. In other words,
individuals are aware of unnecessary spending and may be able to cut this consumption and
place this money for savings. Utilities and regular consumption of food were the most
frequent items that individuals reported to consume more than needed. Respondents also
pointed out other expenses such as clothing, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, fast food,
lotteries and entertainment. Table 7 reports the percentages. This information provides
evidence that families are spending more than they consider necessary in consumer staples.
However, in conversations with these families it was noticeable the desire to reduce
spending of groceries to be able to save some money and make their regular contributions
to the savings fund; in particular because it is the largest account from their budget. The
consumption of other goods is not very significant in comparison with total expenditure;
therefore, even if it is reduced, the money may not be enough to save.
The survey investigated the difficulties that families usually have when they have to
pay households’ expenses. Table 8 shows that at some point in the month prior to the
survey, these families had some trouble paying their utility bills, food and debt (32%, 30%
and 21%, respectively). Many individuals report more than one difficulty. In other cases,
families experience problems to find the money for school fees (9%), rent (8.9%) or
medical expenses (7.7%). The most common solution to these situations is borrowing
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money from friends, family or neighbors (54.1%). Other alternatives are receiving
assistance from friends, family and neighbors (13.9%), using household savings (10.9%) or
using money from moneylenders (9.7%). However the latter is frequently an expensive
solution to the financial difficulties. In 7% of the cases, individuals reduce the consumption
of food and other items. (See Table 9.) The social networks created or strengthened in the
VSLAs contribute to mitigating the financial stress in the future. Its methodology and
access to different types of services provide alternatives such as access to cheaper and
easier-to-get loans, the social fund (or emergency/assistance fund).

g. Household income
The survey investigated the actual monthly income and hypothetical or necessary
income that a family requires in order to adequately meet its monthly basic needs. The
reported actual monthly income of a household in the study sample is USD 355. However
the majority of individuals consider that their household requires an income approximately
60% larger (of about USD 590) to be able to satisfy the monthly basic needs without stress.
Income per capita in these households is of about USD 99 per month or USD 1,188 per
year. Figure 3 depicts the density of actual and hypothetical monthly household income of
the sample. Both distributions are right or positively skewed, implying a larger
concentration in lower levels of income.
Comparing actual monthly income received by a representative household at the
national level, it is larger than the one observed in the VSLA sample of households (USD
391 vs. USD 355), where households in urban areas receive about 61% more than in the
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VSLA sample or USD 591 per month per household. This number reaches USD 188 for
households in rural areas (see Table 1).
I also calculated the proportion of households belonging to 5 different income groups.
Table 10 shows that 18.4% of households receive a monthly income of less than USD 150
per month, 24.4% receive up to USD 250, 16.4% receive USD 251 to USD 300, 18.6%
receive USD 301 to USD 450 and 22.2% receive more than USD 450 per month.

h. Experience with financial services
Information about the experience of households with, formal or informal, financial
services prior to the exposure to the program was also gathered in the survey. Table 11
describes all types of savings holdings for all households and the respective savings
balances. I find that 41% of households that participate in VSLAs hold some type of
savings before joining a VSLA. Most of these households, 26.4%, save by stashing cash at
home for short periods of time. The data show that these households hold a cash balance of
an average of USD 49 per month.39 The second most frequent type of savings is a bank, but
this represent medium to long term savings, such as saving for home improvements, etc.
7% of the sample had an average of USD 423 saved in a bank before joining a VSLA.
Other savings alternatives are purchasing animals or seeds (3.2%) and keeping the money
in self-help groups or ROSCAs (2.3%).
At the national level, savings rates are lower. As observed in the ELCA 2010, only
13.32% of households in Colombia have any type of savings; 17.06% in urban areas and
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This information was confirmed during the focus groups discussions. Women are more likely to keep some
money from groceries into a can or a piggy bank. But it does not last long because women or other members
in the household use it for unexpected or discretionary spending.
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9.29% in rural areas, demonstrating the lack of savings in the country and the need of
designing specialized products for all types of individuals (see Table 1 for data reported in
the ELCA 2010).
It is interesting that access to bank accounts is not a limitation for these households or
for saving. 45% of individuals interviewed reported having an active bank account.
However, it is used mainly to receive CCTs or government transfers (50%) or for payroll
services (34%). Only 23% of households with a bank account use it to keep their savings.
This small usage of bank accounts provides evidence that although poor households have
access to formal financial services, information and knowledge gaps may be the biggest
barriers to financial inclusion.
Loans are another service that was reported in the VSLA survey. 31% of individuals
interviewed reported having applied at least once for a loan within the year prior to the
survey. From these, 63% applied in a bank or financial institution, 23.3% to informal
lenders and 8.8% to relatives, friends or neighbors. A smaller fraction borrowed money
from their employees’ fund, credit unions, utilities providers or pawnshops. In almost all
cases the loan was provided. See Table 12 for reference. Banks and credit unions provide
the largest amount of money borrowed. Fluctuating from USD 2,000 to over USD 2,200.
Loans given by relatives, friends and neighbors, informal lenders and utilities providers
were of between USD 250 and USD 370. Pawnshops and self-help groups were another
alternative that provided loans for about USD 325 and USD 650, respectively.
It is not surprising to observe the high incidence of loans among this population. In
particular, informal lending from payday lenders, relatives, friends and neighbors is
common since it is easier to access, is provided in a timely manner. Loans from banks and
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credit unions are more often used for investments in businesses or financing new homes,
for that reason the amount borrowed is larger and the repayment period is longer. These
numbers are similar to what happens at the national level, in urban and rural areas. The use
of credit is large among the population.
This information provides evidence that vulnerable households may have some access
to financial services. However, savings rates are very low. For that reason, designing
commitment products to promote services are essential for financial inclusion. During the
baseline survey, the study searched for the motivation of these families to join a VSLA. It
is surprising to note that their perception about low savings is not just related to lack of
access to financial services. Instead, members of the VSLAs admit that their low savings
rates may be the result of behavioral barriers, such as self-control and temptation.
Individuals report the following reasons that explain why saving in a VSLA is easier:
saving with others (56.1%), savings in small amounts (16.6 %), quick and easy loans (6.7
%), has no costs (5.2 %). Only 6.3% of individuals don’t have any other place to deposit
their savings.

3.5.

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

The qualitative information described in previous sections provides an understanding
of the situation of individuals that join a VSLA and those who, being offered the possibility
may join. The sample is a good representation of the types of individuals that participate in
the program and provides rich information about their households’ characteristics.
However, to capture the perceptions, attitudes toward saving and dynamics inside VSLAs
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after being exposed to the program for one cycle of savings (approximately 8 months) I
conducted 4 focus groups discussions in 2 municipalities. The results are reported below.
Saving is understood as a mechanism to insure themselves and their household in case
of unexpected shocks on their finances. Before joining a VSLA, households were skeptical
about their ability to make contributions to the savings fund, mainly, because their income
sources fluctuate greatly. However, a few weeks after being in the program and once they
learn how a VSLA functions, individuals acknowledge that saving is an act of willpower
more than it is of financial capability. Some of the impressions of participant in the focus
group sessions were:40
“When I received my money at the end of the savings cycle I thought: those are beers
that I didn’t drink, but it was worth it”
“I stretch the money that I receive for grocery shopping”
“You have to sacrifice some things for saving”
“I tell my husband that why doesn’t he joints the group, but he says that a dollar daily
is nothing, they want to save 25 or even 50 dollars per day, but they frequently postpone it
and never save a dime”
“The savings group was liquidated but I continued saving on my own”
Before being part of a VSLA most individuals reported having had different types of
savings such as stashing cash at home, through a deposit collector, purchasing animals, etc.
However, they were aware of the risks associated with those: “… thieves came and took my

40

Translation by the author.

37

piggy bank from the house” or “it’s a temptation having cash at home, then why saving at
home?”41
In other cases, saving in a bank was perceived as a medium to long term saving to
achieve bigger goals or life dreams, such as buying property or starting a business. It
involves a planned, systematic and long run effort that in many cases is very costly to
achieve. Also, the transaction costs associated with holding a bank account discourages
individuals from using them to make deposits:
“We have to pay the bank to keep our savings… instead of giving us return, it takes
away our money”
Their experience in the VSLA demonstrates a strong attachment and gratification to
the program, which may be difficult to find in other types of savings. Although the savings
motivations differ across members of the group, the sympathy created among them
supports each other. Their behavior and decisions made usually benefit them all equally.
They all share and nurture from their effort and discipline, building up trust between each
other. Their experience in the VSLA enables a social behavior, values and norms such as
cooperation, solidarity, transparency and respect. It is common to observe the development
of social activities to raise their savings, and in many occasions involve other household
members.
Despite the benefits of learning how to behave in a collective environment in which all
start under the same conditions, over time the group imposes their own dynamics, often
motivated by the behavior of those who save the most. But when the group is

41

Although keeping the money in a box as in the VSLAs is also risky, in all the time of operation of the
program, only 4 boxes have been stolen, which is not very risky.
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heterogeneous, some members feel anxiety and discomfort, creating disruption and
problems in the VSLA. When this is the case, members that contribute smaller amounts of
savings and are unable to catch up feel the social pressure to raise contributions. On the
other hand active savers feel uncomfortable because a low saving balance is detrimental to
the fund’s earnings. It limits the availability of funds for loans and at the same time the
return on their savings. As stated by some of the members, social pressure to raise savings
increase over time along with their experience in the group in the following lines: “the
group exerts pressure and also competition”, and “when there are women, men are
humiliated to constantly purchase more shares, because they are the ones who work and
earn more”.
In general, the VSLA methodology promotes savings among participants not just
because it offers an opportunity to make deposits in a savings fund, but also because the
social nature of the VSLA acts as an incentive mechanism to encourage a change in
behavior towards saving. The group-oriented behavior also acts as a mechanism to
achieving individual goals.
In many cases the savings collected from the VSLA helps to create income-generating
activities and provides economic independence from some members of a household:
“My husband does not participate in the savings group and sometimes he scolds me…
he doesn’t want me to find a job, but when I received my savings from the first savings
cycle, I collected USD 150 and I said to myself: I will open a small shop… and I did.”
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3.6.

CONCLUSION

This essay describes the characteristics of individuals that belong to Village Savings
and Loan Associations (VSLA). VSLAs are informal arrangements offered to low-income
households in developing countries that bring access to financial services such as savings
and loans. Individuals self-select and make regular contributions to a self-managed savings
fund.
Using quantitative and qualitative data collected from surveys in Colombia of
individuals that participate in VSLAs, I find that VSLA members are individuals that are
above or in the upper limit of the poverty line. Although the target population for the
program is poor and extremely poor households, the self-selection component of the
methodology of the program make it hard to motivate poor and extremely poor individuals
to participate in the program.
I describe the observable characteristics of these households in terms of housing,
composition of the household, health, food security, income generating activities,
experience with financial services, ownership of assets and durables, and household
expenditures. The quantitative information was gathered in April-June of 2013 for a sample
of 1,207 participants in VSLAs.
I compare the situation of these households with what is observe at the national level
(total average, urban and rural averages) using information collected in the first wave of the
Colombian Longitudinal Survey of Wealth, Income, Labor and Land (ELCA) in 2010. In
many variables of interest, the situation of the VSLA households is comparable with those
at the national level. This information provides a reference point for the readers of the types
of households that join a VSLA.
40

Further research may be done to study how the VSLA population is compared to the
average population in the municipalities where the program operates. I am currently
gathering data from household surveys in Colombia with the purpose of determining how
we may identify the VSLA population within the rest of the population and being able to
validate the benefits of participating in this program with respect to other formal and
informal arrangements. Also, the information could help determine if the characteristics of
the municipalities affect the composition and formation of VSLAs.
The qualitative data illustrates the change in behavior of individuals after being
exposed to the program. Members of a VSLA are motivated to contribute to the savings
fund as a result of the social pressure created within the group. Individuals learn how to
save in a regular basis, find different ways to get extra cash at home or from incomegenerating activities in order to contribute to the savings fund and be able to reach their
savings goals, better prepared to face shocks in the future and improve the wellbeing of
their household.
Financial inclusion via informal arrangements may be the first step towards a change
in financial behavior. Practitioners and policy makers should put some attention to
designing or offering innovative products that are consistent with the heterogeneity and the
needs of different types of population. Formal banking is key to helping vulnerable
households to manage and accumulate assets. However, in many cases the existing supply
of products and programs is inconvenient and does not match the demand or at least does
not provide enough motivation for individuals to change their behavior toward savings.
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Table 1. Comparison of situation of households between VSLA survey and ELCA 2010
VSLA
members
A. Household characteristics:
HH size
Number of children
Familias en Accion (CCTs program)
Red Unidos
B. School attendance:
Elementary school graduates
High school graduates
College graduates
C. Occupation and income:
Employed in a paid activity for more than 1 month
Employed government
Employed private sector
Self-employed
Household income
D. Access and usage to financial services:
Save
Monthly savings
Access to credit
E. Housing:
Home ownership
Floor materials (soil, bad quality wood)
Water from acueduct

National
average

Urban

Rural

4.20
1.9
54.3%
25.70%

4.35
2.6
29.73%
1.67%

4.18
2.14
19.13%
1.03%

4.56
3.05
41.97%
2.42%

44.9%
24.0%
3.2%

48.11%
32.28%
2.92%

31.64%
44.22%
5.32%

65.45%
19.72%
0.44%

42.30%
7.30%
30.90%
31.10%
355

45.32%
5.32%
41.18%
41.49%
391

67.08%
5.34%
40.33%
43.84%
579

22.85%
5.26%
44.00%
33.64%
188

41%
33
62.90%

13.32%
74
55.03%

17.06%
91
60.80%

9.29%
40
48.37%

63.66%
12.50%
67%

49.24%
17.02%
80.38%

45.68%
5.54%
95.56%

53.35%
30.27%
62.87%

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED. And ELCA 2010.
Universidad de Los Andes.

Table 2. Housing
Housing
Home ownership
Own, still paying
Own, totally paid
Rent
Usufructuary
Sources of financing
Savings
Loan from financial institution
Informal loans
Inheritance
Subsidy
Multiple sources

%
4.7
47.8
24.7
20.9
39.5
6.7
1.8
19.6
6.4
25.2

Material of walls
Clay and wood
Block, brick, stone, polished wood
Bamboo, other plant
Rough wood, board
Panel
Rammed soil
Zinc, fabric, cardboard, cans, recycling, plastics

6.2
81.2
0.3
7.0
0.5
4.6
0.1

Material of floor
Carpet, marble, polished wood
Tile, vinyl, brick or tablet
Cement, gravel
Unfinished wood
Soil or sand

0.2
34.1
52.7
2.9
9.6

%
Material of ceiling
Cement, gravel
Iron sheets, zinc
Wood, brick, clay tile
Straw, bamboo, other plant
Plastic, cans, cardboard, waste
Fuel used for cooking
Mineral coal
Electricity
Natural gas connected to public network
Propane gas cylinder or pipette
Kerosene, oil, petrol, white gasoline, alcohol
Firewood, charcoal
Waste material
Source of water for cooking and drinking
Community or village aqueduct
Public system
Rainwater collection
Public pile, tanker, waterboy
Well with pump
Artisanal well
River, creek, spring
Sanitary
Toilet connected to sewage
Toilet connected to septic tank
Toilet without connection
Latrine
Do not have toilet

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.
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12.0
24.9
62.4
0.6
0.2
0.6
2.2
34.0
39.6
0.0
23.4
0.0
20.3
46.7
7.6
15.2
6.0
0.3
3.9
48.6
42.3
2.1
1.4
5.1

Table 3. Health and food security
Health and nutrition of households
Afiliation to health system
Subsidized
Contributive
Not affiliated
Health
Received a medical service in the last month
Days absent from school/work due to illness
Medical expenses paid in last month (USD)
Food insecurity
An adult reduced the amount of food consumed in the last month
Number of days an adult reduced amount of food in last month
A child reduced the amount of food consumed in the last month
Number of days a child reduced amount of food in last month
Had difficulties to get food in the last month
Number of meals that had yesterday

Participants
74.4%
20.7%
4.0%
6.4%
5.0
35
14.1%
9.2
8.4%
9.4
15.6%
2.7

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.

Table 4. Occupation
Panel A. Occupation, last week (%)
% in any type of paid job
Worked in a paid job
Family worker with payment
Worked in paid job at least one hour and did job search
Didn't work but had a paid job
Family worker without payment
Attended school and didn't work
Household chores
Took care of other member of household (elderly, children)
Didn't work because is disabled
Retiree, has a pension

All adults
42.3
35.5
2.0
3.0
1.8
1.5
25.1
24.7
0.8
1.7
1.3

Household head
74.0
63.4
2.8
5.2
2.6
2.4
1.0
14.7
0.3
1.4
3.0

Panel B. Type of activity for those with any paid job (%)
Domestic worker (housekeeper, etc.)
7.4
5.1
Employee of private sector
30.9
31.4
Government employee
7.3
7.2
Farm work in other household/farm
14.6
16.2
Self-employed
31.1
32.3
Work with animals
0.3
0.2
Non-farm job (services, etc.)
2.1
1.5
Other
6.3
6.1
Notes: Adults refer to women and men in a household with more than 10 years of age. Source: Baseline
survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.
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Table 5. Performance of businesses

USD

Averages:
Sales
Expenses
Profit

367
210
157

57.2%
42.8%

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.

Table 6. Ownership of assets, durables and animals
Ownership of assets, durables and animals (%)
Telephone
5.1
AC
Cellphone
95.9 Fan
Bed
98.8 Bike
Matress
98.2 Motorbike
Dining table
47.1 Car
Coffee table
72.5 Boat
Chairs
90.6 Tools
Sofa
27.9 Machete
Cooking pots and pans
96.2 Wheelbarrow
Wardrobe
76.3 Shover
Washing machine
41.0 Hoe
Fridge
71.5 Pump/water can
Blender
82.6 Ax
Stove (electric or gas)
80.4 Chainsaw
Microwave
8.5
Mill
TV
89.0 Animals
Sewing machine
8.0
Cattle
Camera or videocamera
6.8
Sheep
DVD
42.5 Horses, donkey
Music player
35.5 Pigs
Computer (home use only) 16.7 Chickens
Vacum cleaner
0.2
Rabbits / Guinea pigs

2.5
41.1
34.5
19.1
6.7
1.3
43.9
13.1
41.0
20.6
6.5
26.3
1.1
16.2
8.2
1.2
4.7
8.1
19.6
4.7

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.

Table 7. Evidence of discretionary spending
Household could spend less in… (%)
Fast food
Tea of coffee
Entertainment
Cellphone bills
Utilities
Tobacco
Lotteries
Celebrations / events
Alcoholic beverages
Food
Clothing, jewelry
Other
Cannot spend less in any item

Untreated
7.9%
2.7%
7.1%
6.4%
38.8%
6.6%
8.8%
3.8%
9.5%
25.2%
19.1%
1.6%
13.5%

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.
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Table 8. Common financial difficulties
% of households that had difficulties to pay the
following expenditures, in the last month:
Food
Utilities
School fees
Rent
Debt
Medical expenses
Entertainment
Clothing & shoes
Celebrations & events

29.9
32.3
9.0
8.9
21.0
7.7
2.7
10.9
2.7

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.

Table 9. Solutions to financial difficulties
How did the household solve the difficulty? (%)
Loan from relatives, friends, neighbors
Loan from informal lender
Loan from a bank or financial institution
Sold an animal, durable, or inventory
Assistance from relative, friend, neighbor
Reduced food consumption
Reduced consumption of other things

54.1
9.7
1.9
1.3
13.9
7.4
7.1

Used household savings
Did nothing
Other

10.9
8.1
4.0

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.

Table 10. Distribution of household in income quintiles
Income quintiles (USD)
Less than 150
151 - 250
251 - 300
301 - 450
More than 450

Treated
18.4%
24.4%
16.4%
18.6%
22.2%

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.
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Table 11. Savings
Savings
% holds any savings
Bank or financial institution
Cash at home
Purchase animals or seeds
Purchase of durables
Self-help group (no VSLA)
Lending money to someone
Credit union
Other type of savings

% hold savings
41%
7.0%
26.4%
3.2%
0.3%
2.3%
0.7%
0.4%
0.8%

Savings
balance (USD)
423
49
333
261
221
343
277
326

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED.

Table 12. Loans
Loans
Bank or financial institution
Informal lender
Credit unions
Relatives, friends, neighbors
Pawnshop
Self-help group (no VSLA)
Utilities provider
Other

% applied for
a loan
62.9
23.3
3.5
8.8
0.5
1.1
0.8
4.8

% Received
loan
94
100
100
94
100
100
100
94

Amount borrowed
(USD)
2,023
249
2,242
298
325
648
367
340

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED
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Figure 1. Economic activities of businesses
29%
26%

17%
11%
8%
5%

Services

Commercial
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Mining

4%

Farming, Crafts & arts
forestry and
fishery

Other

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED

Figure 2. Household expenditures
Other
consumptio
n. 5.5%

Housing.
17.0%

Education.
8.7%

Basic
consumptio
n. 68.8%

Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED
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Figure 3. Household income (USD): real and necessary
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Source: Baseline survey Impact Evaluation of VSLA in Colombia. IDB-MIF-IED
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Chapter 4: Private vs. Public Mental Accounts:
Experimental Evidence from Savings Groups in
Colombia
4.1.

INTRODUCTION

Savings are important to poor households. Capital and asset accumulation can help
provide poor and extremely poor households with an improved ability to generate future
income and more effectively fight poverty in the future, and smooth consumption and
investment plans in the face of adverse shocks.42 Poor households save small amounts of
cash flows via informal providers such as ROSCAs and deposit collectors; or save by
holding risky assets (livestock, stored grain, durable goods).43 In all forms of microfinance,
high costs of monitoring and transaction relative to the size of the financial amounts
involved have often worked to reduce both the supply and the demand for formal financial
services or made access costly for clients.44 For this reason, innovations to bring down
costs and improve the terms and usefulness of services offered to the poor are key to
expanding service. I design and evaluate two modifications of a well-established
methodology of self-help groups in Colombia called Village Savings and Loan
Associations (VSLA), in order to understand if private or public commitment through the
creation and salience of ‘mental savings accounts’, affects savings behavior. The results

42

Karlan and Morduch (2009), and Burgees et al (2005).
Duflo and Banerjee (2007), Dupas and Robinson (2010), Collins et al (2009), Karlan and Murdoch (2009).
44
Karlan and Morduch, 2009; and Dupas and Robinson (2010).
43
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show that public commitment is very effective in increasing savings and private
commitment has heterogeneous behavioral responses of treatment effects.
Recent evidence suggests that self-control problems and time inconsistent preferences
of individuals might prevent them from making optimal decisions in everyday scenarios
such as waking up early, starting a diet, doing homework, or even saving.45 As a result,
individuals often demand and rely upon commitment mechanisms to mitigate these
problems. According to Bryan at el (2010), commitment mechanisms provide individuals
with tools to help them stick to a plan that might otherwise be repeatedly postponed
because of a disparity between their long and short run intentions. Frequently, individuals’
preferences for future choices are valued disproportionately lower over current ones46
leading to situations such as clicking the snooze button of the alarm clock or delaying their
workout one more day. As a result, individuals end up running anxious to catch the last
train and a lecture from the boss, or having to bear that back pain that they have not
managed to escape from. These situations are common when making financial choices.
Consequently, savings rates and assets accumulation are often low, and this is not just the
result of lack of access to formal financial services. A commitment mechanism is something
that helps us promise our current selves to behave according to our future best interests. In
the context of under-savings, a commitment device is an arrangement used by individuals to
incentivize higher savings or penalize failure to making deposits. These rewards or
penalties could be economic (hard commitment) or psychological (soft commitment). In this
study I use a soft commitment device to evaluate how individuals respond to self-control
problems associated to savings decisions.
45
46

Laibson (1997), Angeletos et al (2001), Shefrin and Thaler (1981).
Angeletos et al (2001), Bryan et al (2010).
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This study describes the design and implementation of a Randomized Controlled Trial
to evaluate if relatively simple modifications to how an existing savings product was
framed and labeled creates a commitment mechanism and how it affects savings
accumulations and other outcomes of low-income individuals in newly formed Village
Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs) in Colombia. 47 Under the existing VSLA
methodology, individuals are encouraged to save but they make no explicit statement of a
commitment to reach particular savings goals. Motivated by hypotheses derived from
behavioral economics, the designed experiment explores how private- and public-labeling
alternatives in the ways in which individuals are asked to declare their savings as
earmarked for a particular purpose might affect program outcomes hypothesizing that this
might work via differences in how mental accounts are created and labeled. Individuals in
the private-labeling treatment create and label a ‘mental savings account’ and state a
savings goal privately. In the public-labeling treatment, label and state savings goals
individually but were then asked to publicly reveal and announce their chosen goals to
other members of the savings group.48 In this way individuals in both treatment groups are
able to label their ‘mental savings account’ and create private or public commitments to
reaching individual savings goals.
Behavioral economics has been increasingly accepted to be able to make predictions of
field phenomena.49 An important result in behavioral economics is that mental accounting
is a commitment mechanism that individuals use in inter-temporal decision-making in order

47

In Colombia, more than 4,500 VSLAs have been formed with over 70,000 beneficiaries up to date. The
program targets more than 5 million poor and extremely poor households registered at Red Unidos, the largest
anti-poverty intervention in the country. The global outreach of the VSLA clients is of over 8.7 million in the
five continents (Source: VSL Associates).
48
I will use the words VSLA or savings groups interchangeably.
49
Camerer et al (2004).
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to constrain their own behavior.50 Mental accounting was originally defined by Richard
Thaler (1985) to be the process of mentally coding and categorizing transactions that
individuals create to mentally separate the money available to make plans and keep track of
their spending. Individuals assign their available income to different expenditure accounts
and put labels such as rent, pension, entertainment, etc. This violates the classical principle
of fungibility of money in which money should not have labels attached51 and therefore,
individuals should be able to transfer money from one account to other accounts without
any (implicit or explicit) costs.
Individuals often rely upon mental accounts as a commitment device to mitigate selfcontrol problems associated with inter-temporal choices.52 For this reason, by implicitly or
explicitly categorizing mental accounts, individuals impose constraints to their behavior,
are often better able to achieve initially chosen savings goals and use financial services
more effectively to raise incomes and welfare.53 As a result, individuals may save more
when they save for a declared purpose. Relatively little evidence however has been
collected from actual field experiments to indicate how much practical and policy
importance such strategies might have on individual behavior.
Thaler (1999) argues that how mental accounts are framed, labeled and evaluated are
key components in the decision-making process. If fungibility is violated, the way in which
savings choices are framed can have significant impacts on actual savings outcomes. This
finding provides a framework for thinking about how individuals evaluate (open and close),
frame and label mental accounts in a way to maximize their utility when making financial
50

Thaler (1985).
Thaler (1985 & 1999), Hastigs and Shapiro (2013).
52
Bryan et al (2010), Shefrin and Thaler (2004) and Kast and Pomeranz (2009).
53
Thaler (1985).
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choices. For this reason, studying further these elements help us understand better how the
process in which mental accounts, as a commitment device, are created actually matter for
savings decisions. The contribution of this study is to investigate if opening mental
accounts publicly, instead of privately, increases savings through additional constraints
imposed to the behavior of individuals as a result of the ‘public’ nature of commitment. A
recent field experiment by Kast et al (2012) shows that commitment is effective at
increasing savings. It uses peers as a commitment device, while this study uses mental
accounting as a commitment device to constrain savings behavior and investigates if such
accounts could be artificially created by labeling their ‘savings’ account privately or in the
presence of their peers.
The RCT randomly assigned 137 newly formed VSLA, mainly in rural areas from nine
municipalities of Colombia into two treatments and a control group. Individuals in the
control group were exposed to the standard VSLA model. 54 In the private-labeling
treatment members received an additional module with a short organized guided
conversation aimed at discussing and highlighting the difficulties of committing to a
savings path and the potential role and use of mental accounts in strengthening those
commitments. I asked participants to voluntarily state in writing a savings purpose and
weekly savings goals. This was intended to help guide individuals to form and label their
mental ‘savings’ account to privately commit to achieving that savings purpose. Goals were
not stated publicly. The public-labeling treatment was similar except that the group
discussion encouraged members to make commitments to themselves as well as to others in
54

Members of the VSLA meet every two weeks to make contributions to a self-managed and self-capitalized
savings fund by purchasing shares of the fund. In addition to savings individuals are able to take small loans
on terms set by the group at interest rates that are typically much lower than available from other sources. The
duration of the savings cycle is from 8 to 9 months at the end of which the funds are distributed according
each individual’s accumulated shares.
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their group in order to explore the possibility that this might lead to different outcomes. As
in the private-labeling treatment members were asked to voluntarily state a savings purpose
and weekly savings goals in writing, but in this intervention, those commitments were
shared with all members of the group. By doing this, individuals explicitly label their
‘mental savings account’ and publicly commit to their own decision. Prior to the public
announcement, individuals were not informed about the (public) nature of the treatment or
their commitment.55 This module included a trust building game and a guided conversation
aimed at highlighting the achievements of group commitments.56
With the experimental design I studied how labeling mental accounts in a social
environment (publicly) gives rise to higher savings rates and to higher achievement of
savings goals in comparison to labeling mental accounts privately. Public commitment of
savings goals creates implicit agreements that may affect or even change the behavior of
some members of a group.57 The anticipation of “social punishment”, in the form of a
shame act or harm to reputation acts as a mechanism to induce individuals to save more and
achieve their commitments more often. As a result, higher savings balances and goal
achievement rates in the public-labeling treatment group support this idea because
individuals fear breaking commitments made to other members of the group more than
commitments made only to themselves.

55

Although individuals seemed shy when the experimenter invited to share their commitments, 100% of those
in the treatment intervention decided to share it with other members of the group.
56
The trust building activity played at the beginning of the public-labeling treatment is called “Game with
balloons”. One balloon was distributed to each member of the VSLA and they were challenged to push the
balloon up and keep it in the air. Once they were able to hold them up in the air, I added more balloons, so
that each participant had to keep an eye not only on their own balloon but also on the balloons of the others.
The purpose of the game was to build a cooperative environment within members of the VSLA.
57
Gächter and Fehr, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Carpenter et al, 2010.
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If money were fungible or perfectly substitutable, the marginal propensity to consume
ought to be the same out of all sources of income and assigning labels to specific
expenditures or accounts would not have any impact on how the money is spent.
Individuals would just transfer money from, say, the ‘rent’ account to the ‘leisure’ account
without imposing any psychological or monetary costs.58 If this were the case, labeling
savings accounts (privately or even publicly) would not affect individual’s savings
decisions in the experimental sample. On the other hand, the classical approach to decisionmaking under uncertainty assumes a self-interested behavior of individuals. Therefore,
choices should not be unaffected by other people’s decisions (neglecting any motivation of
reciprocity and fairness that induce cooperation and enhances group oriented behavior). If
this were the case, social networks wouldn’t be relevant for decision-making and
individuals in the public-labeling treatment will not make any additional effort to achieve
their savings goals and therefore, savings rates would be the same as in the other
experimental groups.
However, the results demonstrate very significant and strong results for treated
individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings increased by an average of 35%
(effect size of up to .38 standard deviations) and individuals were 8.5% more likely to
achieve the initially established savings goals, when I use OLS regressions. Other
estimations suggest similar results. The results for the private-labeling treatment
intervention are heterogeneous. The quantitative and qualitative data indicates that such
heterogeneity comes from intrinsic ability to save of individuals and on institutional
features of the VSLA methodology that impose restrictions on individual savings behavior.
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Thaler (1999), Hastigs and Shapiro (2013).
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In sum, treatment effects are very significant for individuals who initiate purchasing larger
number of shares during the beginning of the VSLA savings cycle and insignificant for
individuals that were in the beginning less able to save. This uncovers the fact that
individuals experience different abilities to respond to the treatment interventions and must
be considered in the analysis. The results are robust to different specifications, as described
in more detail below.
I used mixed methods for data analysis at different stages of the research project.
During July to November of 2011 I administered a baseline survey to 670 individuals from
the experimental sample to measure a set of characteristics and choices prior to their
exposure to the treatments. The second-stage surveying was administered in the fall of
2012, when I followed-up the same group of individuals interviewed at baseline. I also use
administrative records of 1,663 members of the VSLA gathered from two organization
which I worked with: IED/Vital and Plan International. Table 1 summarized the data used
in the study. Finally, I collected qualitative data from focus group discussions to gather
information about the experience and perspectives of participants in the study.
This intervention translates recent theoretical insights into experimental strategies
implemented in the field to both test the theory and possibly improve the impacts of a
large-scale public policy program. The experimental design contributes to the
understanding of how different strategies used to create mental accounts affect choices and
contributes to the growing literature in behavioral economics and microfinance. The
methodology represents a new approach to the study of individual behavior and provides
valuable insights and information to program administrators and policy makers involved in
the design and diffusion of commitment-savings products. The increased availability of

56

these and other products with similar features may serve to increase savings and improve
financial literacy amongst poor households, which may contribute to generate income to
fight poverty.

4.2.

MICROFINANCE IN COLOMBIA

Informal contracting is common in Colombia, predominantly in poor neighborhoods.
A recent study of low and middle-income households in Colombia shows that 90% of the
surveyed families have borrowed money at least once.59 Of these, 83% used informal
lenders (family, neighbors, friends or informal lenders) and less than 30% have used formal
financial institutions (banks, cooperatives).60 Interest charges and other terms of financial
access vary greatly. Almost all families reported holding liquid savings (e.g. saved cash at
home, purchase of durables or through deposit collector). Yet fewer than 2% saved in a
bank.61 Another study shows that that less than 4% of poor women save in a bank and over
70% save in liquid asset holdings, generally to cover daily, unexpected, expenses.62
Although many non-profit and government institutions have designed products to
increase the access to microcredit, its beneficiaries are small entrepreneurs and households
with income levels higher than the poverty line. The government is shifting the focus from
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The sample represents approximately 75% of lower income Colombian households. USAID-Econometria
S.A (2007).
60
Duflo and Banerjee, 2007 also find that almost all extremely poor households in their sample of one region
of India borrowed money from expensive informal lenders. Only 6.4% of extremely poor households
borrowed from a formal lending institution. In contrast, one third of the Indonesian poor population borrows
from a bank. In their book, Portfolios of the Poor, Collins et al (2009) use financial diaries data to document
the extensive use of informal lenders (mostly relatives and friends, some at no interest) by households to
finance expenditures in South Asia and South Africa.
61
Duflo and Banerjee, 2007 also found that few extremely poor households have a savings account, and if
save, they do it through savings collectors or savings clubs like ROSCA or Self-Help Groups.
62
Preliminary report of impacts. Mujeres Ahorradoras, Familias en Accion.
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microcredit to providing alternatives for savings and insurance targeted to poor and
extremely poor households. However, the design of innovative commitment devices to this
population is a relatively new topic in the microfinance agenda.
One component of Red Unidos, the largest Colombian governmental anti-poverty
initiative, offers households access to specialized financial mechanisms linked to transfer
payments including savings, microcredit and micro-insurance.63 Information collected in
the baseline of Red Unidos (nearly 600,000 households) suggest that 80% don’t know how
to use the formal financial services available, and only 1.5% define a savings amount
within the household. From these, 90% had a bank account but was not used to deposit
savings, but mainly for transactional use. Only 7% save in a savings club or through deposit
collectors. Red Unidos initiated a pilot operation in 2007 in 37 municipalities, and started
its expansion to all the regions of the country in June 2008 to enroll 1.5 million families
(1.2 million households classified by the SISBEN index as extremely poor, and 300
thousand displaced from violence).64
In the banking and financial inclusion component of Red Unidos, Banca de las
Oportunidades provides assistance to Red Unidos families to get access to both formal and
informal forms of microfinance. In 2008, Banca de las Oportunidades pilot the program
Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLA) in 34 municipalities. The VSLA
methodology has been implemented in at least 30 developing countries around the globe
and has proven to be effective in providing savings and loan services to local communities
that have not access to formal services. To date, VSLA has almost reached 9 million clients
63

Red Unidos aims to help 16 million people who live under the national poverty line and 5.3 million under
the extreme poverty line. These numbers represent 32.7% and 10.6% of the Colombian population in 2012.
Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica -- DANE.
64
Red Unidos.
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worldwide. 65 Preliminary results from the pilot in Colombia show that individuals
consistently save small amounts of money. It reached almost 7,000 clients with an average
savings of USD 78 over an 8 to 9 months period. Loans were on average of USD 67 each
and less that 25% of participants took a loan, at least in the first savings cycle.66 The
successful experience of the pilot program motivated the expansion of this initiative to
other regions in the country. In June 2011, the government started the expansion to
organize 600 new VSLA in cities and rural areas with high poverty levels and limited
access to formal financial services. I used this expansion to carry out the RCT designed in
this study. In 2013, the government and other multilateral organizations are funding the
promotion of the program in more regions of the country and are planning to form over
2000 new VSLAs.
Village Savings and Loan Associations:
VSLA are community based savings commitment products, built on the ROSCA
model and other self-help savings groups as an alternative to formal microfinance that
offers access to insurance, savings and small loans to the poor with limited or no access to
formal financing.67 Individuals self-select and participate on a voluntary basis to form a
self-managed and self-capitalized fund to save and borrow periodically. Members make
small and regular contributions to the savings fund by purchasing up to 5 shares in each
meeting. Savings are invested in a fund that is soon used to provide small, short-term loans
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VSLA Global Outreach report. Hugh Allen (October 2013).
Banca de las Oportunidades report, VSLA pilot project, January, 2011. VSLAs are commonly operated by
CARE, Oxfam America and Plan International, as well as other local organizations. In Colombia are mostly
operated by IED/Vital and Plan International.
67
Over the last 3 decades, the VSL methodology has been implemented by anti-poverty organizations such as
CARE, Oxfam America, Plan International and others, in different countries, namely: India, Bangladesh,
many African countries and recently, in some Latin American countries. For more information visit VSL
Associates. http://vsla.net/
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to participants, used for consumption, making small investments in their businesses, and
frequently for emergencies. This is complemented by a social fund that is much smaller but
provides insurance to members in the form of grants for fatalities and other unexpected
circumstances. All the purchases of shares takes place with all members of the group in
biweekly meetings and recorded in each member’s passbook. Funds are securely stored in
the safe box and kept by one member of the group until the next meeting. In Colombia,
VSLA are formed by up to 19 members, usually neighbors, friends or family.
The VSLA has a structured methodology and a set of rules that members establish in
the first “training” meeting, before starting making contributions. All members of the group
form a General Assembly, which elects a Management Committee consisting of 5 positions
(chairperson, record-keeper, box-keeper, and 2 money-counters). The General Assembly
also sets the rules and conditions stated in a constitution of the fund that every member
must agree and sign. The constitution contains information of rules of governance, dispute
and resolution, conditions for purchase of shares, uses of the social fund, interest rates and
price of the share. There is a limit in the number of share purchased in each meeting. Each
member cannot purchase more than 5 shares per meeting. However, occasionally, the group
allows extraordinary purchase of shares by all members or sometimes the group purchases
additional shares using money from group activities such as selling food at a fair, raffles,
etc. The share price, interest rate on loans, value of the contribution to the social fund and
other rules are defined prior to the first purchase of shares and are maintained throughout
the first savings cycle. This methodology helps households to manage their cash flows and
be able to accumulate larger amounts of money for investment in businesses, education,
improving housing conditions, or unexpected expenses. At the end of the savings cycle (8
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to 9 months), the fund is closed and the accumulated savings are distributed according to
the shareholdings. The VSLA methodology encourages savings and use of loans but does
not make any activity to explicitly state savings goals or use of savings.

4.3.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

I designed and implemented an RCT to study whether a commitment savings product,
private or publicly created, may affect savings decisions of low-income individuals that
participate in newly formed VSLA in Colombia. Under the existing VSLA methodology,
individuals are encouraged to save but make no explicit statement of a commitment to
reach particular savings goals. Motivated by hypotheses derived from behavioral
economics, the designed experiment explores how private-labeling and public-labeling
alternatives in the ways in which individuals are asked to declare their savings
commitments might affect program outcomes, hypothesizing that this might work via
differences in how mental accounts are created. In the private-labeling treatment,
individuals label their mental “savings” account and state a savings goal individually; and
in the public-labeling treatment, individuals label and state savings goals individually, and
then share their goals with all the members of the group. In this way individuals are able to
label their mental “savings” account and create private or public commitments to reaching
individual savings goals.
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Hypotheses:
People often find it valuable and practical to form “mental accounts” 68 as a device to
constrain their own behavior. As a result, individuals often save more when they save for a
declared purpose. This result indicates a violation of the classical assumption of fungibility
of money. If money were fungible or perfectly substitutable, the marginal propensity of
consuming all sources of income should be the same and assigning labels to specific
expenditures or accounts would not have any impact on how the money is spent.
Individuals would just transfer money from, say, “rent” account to “leisure” account
without imposing any psychological or monetary costs (Thaler, 1999; Hastigs and Shapiro,
2013). If this were the case, labeling savings accounts (privately or publicly) would not
affect savings decisions of individuals in the experimental sample. The standard utility
maximization model suggest that accounts are perfectly substitutable, thus the marginal
cost of using one dollar to purchase unnecessary or unplanned goods should be the same to
the marginal benefit of one dollar in the established savings goal. As a result, in this
experimental setting, labeling mental accounts doesn’t matter and savings rates should be
the same for control and treated individuals. In addition, achievement of savings goals
should be the same for all.
Another classical approach to decision-making under uncertainty is that individual’s
are self-interested utility maximizers. This indicates that their choices are unaffected by
other people’s choices, and always choose an optimal action that yields the highest
monetary payoff (neglecting any motivation of reciprocity and fairness that induce
cooperation and enhances group oriented behavior). If this is the case, social networks
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Thaler and Benartzi (2004), Thaler and Sunstein (2009) and Kast and Pomeranz (2009).
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don’t matter. Consequently, the experimental design predicts that (self-interested)
individuals in the public-labeling treatment will not make any additional effort to achieve
their savings goals and therefore, will not have larger savings rates or achievement of
savings goals in comparison with the control group or the private-labeling treatment group.
According to these interpretations I evaluate the following null hypotheses: (i)
Individuals in the public-labeling treatment group have the same savings rates than those in
the control group. (ii) Although individuals in the public-labeling treatment create their
savings goals in a more cooperative environment, they save the same amount than those in
the private-labeling treatment group. (iii) Conditional on savings commitments (labels),
individuals in the public-labeling treatment are equally likely to achieve their initially
established savings goals than the control and private-labeling treatment. Thus, if
commitment devices matter, I expect all three of these hypotheses to be rejected.
Assignment to treatment and experimental groups:
I randomly assigned newly formed VSLA to two treatments and one control group in 9
municipalities of Colombia. The assignment of the VSLA was carried out using a simple
lottery and the method is called spot-randomization in which the assignment to treatment
was random at the time when the VSLA was formed. For example, if 5 new VSLA were
formed in a week in Cartagena, I draw the type of intervention that the VSLA would be
assigned to (private, public or control). This status is maintained throughout all the
experimental period. The unit of randomization is the savings group (VSLA) and the unit of
analysis is at the individual level.
Individuals in the control group are exposed to the standard VSLA model which uses a
well-scripted model to organize eligible beneficiaries, and allows individuals to save and
63

borrow for any group-approved purpose. Individuals in the private-labeling treatment
group are subject to an added discussion module aimed at highlighting and discussing the
difficulties of committing to a savings path and the potential role of using mental accounts
in strengthening those commitments. The session ended by asking members to voluntarily
state in writing a savings purpose and weekly savings goals. In the private-labeling
treatment individuals create (open) and label their mental “savings” account that may
contribute to higher savings rates.
The public-labeling module is similar except that it encouraged members to make
commitments both to themselves and to others in their group, which may let me explore the
possibility that this might lead to different outcomes. This module includes trust-building
games and a guided conversation aimed at highlighting the achievements of group
commitments. As in the private-labeling treatment, members were asked to voluntarily
state a savings purpose and a weekly savings goal in writing, but in this intervention those
commitments were also shared with all members of the group. By doing this, individuals
explicitly label their mental account and publicly commit to their own decision. In the
beginning of the session, individuals seemed shy when the experimenter invited to share
their commitments. However, 100% of participants agreed to share their goals with other
members of the group and in the end became very enthusiastic about sharing their dreams
with everyone in the group. The experimenter verified the accuracy of the written
commitments. In addition, members of the savings group committed to help each other to
reach their goal. For this reason I am able to calculate Average Treatment Effects of the
treatment intervention on the outcomes of interest.
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The RCT compares the situation of individuals who are statistically equivalent at the
baseline but are exposed to different interventions. For this reason, any difference observed
across the treatments and control groups is attributable to the intervention. The random
assignment allows controlling for selection bias present in the estimates and allows
determining causal effects of the interventions on the outcomes of interest. The hypotheses
allow investigating how small variations in the information provided, and how it is framed,
may affect savings behavior, their ability to commit (privately or publicly) to a savings
product and their ability to use financial products more effectively. Other dynamics inside
the VSLA may also be evaluated, such as whether individuals punish or reward the
behavior of other members of the group, according to their performance throughout the
savings cycle.69
Experimental subjects:
The target population is extremely poor individuals with limited access to financial
services that participate in the largest Colombian anti-poverty intervention, Red Unidos.
Using a national system of identification index (SISBEN), families are classified to receive
benefits from social programs offered by national and local governments in a preferential
basis. Some of the programs and projects offered to this population are: housing subsidies,
conditional cash transfers (CCT), training programs, health and nutrition workshops and
vaccination, etc. The VSLAs are an important part of the financial inclusion strategy to help
extremely poor families to manage and accumulate assets and capital, and improve their
well-being.
69

It may be possible to observe what happens when a group member is always purchasing the maximum
number of shares, or when a member is unable to raise their contributions to more than one share. In this
sense, social taxation may be implicitly imposed within the group. Despite the interest of evaluating such
behaviors, the quantitative data does not provide enough information. For that reason, in the focus groups
discussion, I raised this discussion.
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As data from the baseline survey shows, more than 65% of the sample population
belongs to Red Unidos and are recipients of the CCT program, Mas Familias en Accion.
However, comparing the sampled population with an average individual from Red Unidos,
I found that participants in the experiment have higher level of education, report having
more assets and more experience and use of different types of financial services such as a
bank account, loans and savings (although through informal providers).

4.4.

DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE SIZE

Sample Size:
To select the sample size I used a (Multi-Site) Cluster Randomized Trial model from
the Optimal Design software. 70 I introduced an additional level of randomization, by
stratifying the sample of new VSLAs in blocks or different sites in the country and
assigning each VSLA to an experimental group (public-labeling, private-labeling or
control). The randomization was performed within blocks in order to reduce heterogeneity
in the estimates in each site. Sites or blocks were defined as municipalities (9 in total). The
randomization uses a cluster design because of the nature of the savings groups program
and the nature of the interventions testes. As a result, treatment assignment is at the group
level (VSLA) while the unit of analysis is at the individual level. For this reason, I need to
account for the within-group correlation.71
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Spybrook et al (2011).
The (standardized) parameters used for this calculations were as follows: Significance level: 𝛼 = 0.05;
Intra-cluster correlation in the range of: lower bound 𝜌 = 0.05 and an upper bound of 𝜌 = 0.25. This
parameter was assumed considering an intra-cluster covariance of 0.75 to 0.95 based on information from the
pilot. The variance explained by the introduction of the controls not larger than 0.5. An effect size or
Minimum Detectable Effect (MDE) of 0.3 standard deviations of savings balances among those in the publiclabeling treatment versus those in the control group and MDE of 0.2 standard deviations more savings for the
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The sample needed to achieve a statistical power of 80% in each site is approximately
15 clusters. 72 In total, I selected 137 VSLAs. One third is assigned to each experimental
group (control, public-labeling and private-labeling). From each selected VSLA, all
individuals were part of the experimental sample, but I randomly chose 5 members to be
surveyed at their house to collect demographic characteristics.73 In total, the study surveyed
670 experimental subjects at two points in time but uses administrative records of savings
balances for all 137 savings groups, which allowed having a much larger sample to
measure treatment effects. In total the study sample to measure treatment effects is of 1,663
individuals distributed across the three experimental groups.

Quantitative data:
I use two sources of data in the study. First household surveys collected to the sample of
670 individuals at two points in time:
i. Baseline: Prior to the intervention, I had the list of members of the newly formed
VSLA. I randomly chose 5 individuals to be interviewed. The survey took place before
the intervention at the place of residence of the individual. I measure a set of individual
and household variables in order to evaluate the impact in well-being of the household
and other outcomes as a result of participation in the intervention. I collect data on
public-labeling treatment over private-labeling treatment group. The number of individuals per cluster to be
treated is n = 13; however, only 5 individuals from each cluster were chosen for the household survey. I also
carried out power analysis for sample size calculation using the commands Sampsi and Samclus in Stata and
the results did not change.
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Two other parameters such as the variance explained by the introduction of controls and the variance
explained by blocking were 0.5 and 0.25 respectively. I introduced these parameters in the calculations
because I include some covariates in the regressions in order to gain some precision in the estimated
parameters.
73
Program officers handed a list of all the members of the VSLA and I selected 5 individuals from each to be
surveyed in the baseline, at random.
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demographic characteristics, use and experience of financial services, housing, poverty,
food security, household income and expenditures, social capital, ability to cope with
unexpected shocks and time preferences.
ii. Follow-up: I administered a follow-up survey after the first savings cycle was
closed and savings were distributed among the members of the VSLA. The follow-up
survey allows comparing the situation of participants at two points in time, but given the
random assignment of the experimental groups, any difference in the outcomes of interest
across treatments and control after the intervention should captures the average treatment
effect. Attrition could be a potential bias of the estimates of this study, however, in cases
when the VSLA was dissolved before the pre-established period or a member decided to
defect, I was able to reach them during the follow-up. Because of this, the loss in sample
was very small, less than 5% of the individuals interviewed at baseline did not participate
in the follow-up.
I also use administrative records from program officials. To complete the sample I
worked along with two practitioner institutions in the study. IED/Vital and Plan
International. Two-thirds of the experimental sample was chosen in IED/Vital sites and
one-third in Plan International sites. Although the VSLA methodology in the field followed
by each organization was exactly the same, the information systems and management of
data differ. In particular, the level of detail differs across organizations’ records throughout
the first savings cycle. But overall the information is very useful to evaluate the hypotheses
of the study.

68

Interventions:
During the interventions, the experimenter collected and recorded the savings goals
written by participants in a piece of paper. The principal researcher kept the information in
a safe place without access to anybody. In total, I have data on savings purposes and
weekly savings goals from 903 individuals that participated in the public-labeling and
private-labeling interventions.

Qualitative data:
I collected qualitative information from 4 focus group discussions with the purpose of
exploring further questions related to the understanding of achievement of goals in
treatment and control groups. I also explored other behaviors and perceptions of individuals
as a result of the interventions. The focus groups discussions took place in two of the nine
experimental sites and recruited 30 individuals from the experimental sample. The sample
was split between men and women to perform the discussion separately.

4.5.

RESULTS

Baseline survey:
Data gathered at baseline suggest that the outcomes of interest and other covariates
related to savings are balanced across experimental groups. This implies that the
randomization was effective. Table 3 provides evidence on this statement. It shows no
statistical differences across control, public- and private-labeling in most pre-treatments
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characteristics. As a result, any difference in outcomes post-treatment can be attributed to
the intervention. Table 3 also shows descriptive statistics of the studied sample.
The household size of subjects is between 4.55 for households in the private-labeling
treatment group and 4.72 for households in the control and public-labeling treatment group.
Over 60% are married or live with their partner and have less than 2 children of 15 years or
less living at home. As shown in Table 3, I find significant differences in the number of
children between the private-labeling treatment and the other experimental groups. It is
also important to note that most VSLA participants are women. The percentage of women
varies from 77% to 82% across treatments and control but its difference is not significantly
different from zero. Another variable that illustrates a difference between the experimental
groups is whether a family is recipient of Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT). The number is
significantly lower for the private treatment group. However, the numbers are large.
Around 60% of households in the sample receive CCTs of Mas Familias en Accion. In
contrast, a very small number of households receive in-kind or cash transfers from Adulto
Mayor, a popular elderly transfers program in Colombia.
The data also reveal that 27% to 33% of the sample held any type of savings before
participating in the VSLA program. Their weekly savings rates varied on average from
USD 5.4 for the private-labeling treatment to USD 7.1 for the control groups. Although the
averages are different, they are not statistically different from zero, implying that on
average, individuals in the experimental sample saved more or less the same amount prior
to the treatment intervention.
An interesting result is that around 50% of all subjects report having a bank account.
However, they don’t use it for savings, but rather for transactions. Households commonly
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use bank accounts to receive their CCT payments or to receive their salary. In fact, over
60% of those who have a bank account declared to open the account exclusively to receive
their CCT payments of Mas Familias en Accion. I asked individuals in the sample if
someone in the household took a loan or made an investment in the past 12 months. 13% to
17% took a loan and 33% to 39% of the sample made an investment in purchase of animals,
house improvements, new or existing businesses, etc. Although households use (mostly
informal) financial services, they are not familiar with writing a budget. Household
incomes vary greatly over time; in fact, only 40% of respondent report having a paid job in
the last month. As it is commonly observed in this population, they mainly have informal
jobs.
Surprisingly over 60% of individuals own the house where they currently reside. This
result is very noteworthy because most savings goals are related to home improvement or
acquisition of a new home, suggesting that the conditions of their homes are suboptimal for
living. A smaller number of individuals reported participating in community activities such
as sports clubs, political party, community organization, women’s clubs, etc.
I included in the set of variables the average of an index that measures trust in financial
institutions. From 1 to 5, I asked surveyed individuals how much they trusted banks and
financial institutions where 1 is untrustworthy and 5 is completely trustworthy. On average,
the level of trust is larger than 3. This may inform us that there are other reasons different
than trust why these individuals are not using formal financial services. Finally, the average
number of members of the VSLA is over 13 across all groups. The second panel of the
Table 3 presents the mean difference of a set of variables that measure the perception of
individuals about the ability to save of their households. I asked if they are think their
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households could save “much more”, “more”, “the same” or “not save at all”. I carried out
a Pearson’s chi-squared test to evaluate the associated values for each possible response for
the different experimental groups. The joint test is not significantly different from zero
across all experimental groups (the p-value is 0.294). However, I observe a difference in
the perception that households could save the same. It is much larger for the control than
for both the private- and public-labeling treatment groups. These results indicate that prior
to the intervention, households across experimental groups are similar in their perception
about their ability to save.

Savings commitments:
After the baseline survey was administered, individuals received the standard training
of the VSLA methodology. During one of these sessions I performed the treatment
interventions in which individuals set savings goals and label mental accounts privately or
publicly. After a short discussion, I asked each individual from the public-labeling and
private-labeling treatments to write down in a piece of paper their individual commitment
for their savings. I asked: “What is your plan for the funds saved in this savings group?”
The responses varied from home improvements, education expenditures and investment in
businesses, to health, travel and unexpected expenditures.
Table 4 disaggregates the responses between public-labeling and private-labeling
treatment groups. The data show that about 34% to 43% of participants plan to save in the
VSLA for home improvements or purchase of a new home, around 25% for education for
children or other members of the household, and 25% to 28% to invest in an existing or a
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new business.74 Other savings purposes are: consumption of non-durables such as clothing,
food, celebrations and events (8% to 16%); consumption of durable goods such as
computers, appliances or jewelry (7% to 12%); for an unexpected expenditure or for
emergencies (3% to 4%) and other expenses accounts for less than 3%.75 The third column
of the table displays the t-statistic resulting from the mean comparison of the responses
between the treated individuals. As shown in the table, there are no statistical differences
across treated subjects for most of the stated savings goals. Only the average savings goal
specific to the purchase of a non-durable good such a bicycle, motorbike, computer,
jewelry, etc. is statistically different for the treated groups.
The second set of variables in the table illustrates the amount of savings that
individuals plan to contribute every meeting during the first savings cycle and the
willingness of taking up loans. Individuals from the private-labeling treatment set a
biweekly savings goal of purchasing approximately 3.06 shares in the VSLA meeting,
while individuals from the public-labeling treatment define a savings goal of purchasing
approximately 3.1 shares. The difference between the number of shares that individuals
from each treatment group plan to save weekly is not statistically significant. In contrast, I
observe statistically significant differences between public- and private-labeling treatments
in what individuals express to save in terms of money, prior to the intervention. The
discrepancy between the differences in the number of shares and the savings balances can
be explained by the difference in shares prices across experimental groups. This may be the
result of differences in savings capability across experimental groups.
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This category includes also a retirement plan or to continue saving.
Such as traveling, purchase of a gift, insurance, etc.

73

Treatment effects on savings:
If money were fungible or perfectly substitutable, and if individuals behaved in a
selfish manner, savings choices should not be affected by labeling savings accounts or by
other people’s decisions. However, the results show very significant and strong results for
treated individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings increased by an average of
35% (effect size of up to .38 standard deviations) and individuals were 8.5 more likely to
achieve initially established savings goals. For individuals in the private-labeling treatment
intervention results on savings are heterogeneous. In the following paragraphs I explain in
more detail these findings. The quantitative and qualitative data indicate that such
heterogeneity comes from intrinsic ability to save of individuals and on institutional
features of the VSLA methodology that impose restrictions on individual savings behavior.
In sum, treatment effects are very significant for individuals who start saving a large
number of shares in the beginning of the savings cycle and insignificant for individuals that
are less able to save, even prior to the intervention. However, treatment effects are on
average insignificant. This uncovers the fact that individuals experience different abilities
to respond to the treatment interventions and must be considered in the analysis. The results
are robust to different specifications, as described in more detail below.
The random assignment of subjects to experimental groups allows estimating the
causal effect of the interventions. Differences in the variables of interest capture the
average treatment effect of labeling ‘mental savings accounts’ (that was opened in the
beginning of the VSLA) privately or publicly on savings and other behaviors of treated
subjects. I estimate a simple (OLS) model of differences in savings rates and on the number
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of shares purchased over the first savings cycle, after exposure to the intervention. The
model estimated is:
(1)

𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛽! 𝑇!,! + 𝛽! 𝑇!,! + 𝜀!

where, 𝑌! is the dependent variable, 𝑇! represents the treatment status for each individual in
the sample, R represents private-labeling treatment, U represents public-labeling treatment
and 𝜀! is the disturbance term.
Selection bias is eliminated because of the random assignment of VSLA into different
groups (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). The coefficients measure the average treatment effects
(ATE) of participating in the public-labeling or private-labeling intervention. The
coefficients 𝛽! and 𝛽! measure the average or mean difference in the outcome for
individuals in private-labeling and public-labeling treatment interventions, respectively (or
treated), in comparison with individuals in the control group (or untreated). Table 5
presents the treatment effects on savings from estimating equation (1) using administrative
records. All regressions are estimated with robust standard errors by clustering at the VSLA
level. I estimated the treatment effects on savings accumulations measured with the number
of shares purchased by each individual under various scenarios: first (column 1) during the
entire savings cycle, second (column 2) during the first 6 meetings76, lastly (column 3)
during the entire savings cycle but for only those with the exact same share price.
The regression results in panel A show that both private- and public commitment are
successful in increasing savings accumulations (measured by the number of shares
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This specification is used in order to check for persistence of the treatment interventions on individual’s
savings behavior. The average number of meetings in the first savings cycle is 15.8. However, I only have this
information for two thirds of the sample. For the remaining, I have detailed information of until the sixth
meeting.
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purchased by participants in each meeting). In the total savings cycle individuals in the
private-labeling treatment saved on average 6 shares more, representing a 17% (0.3
standard deviations) increase in savings in comparison with the controls. Moreover, the
increase in shares purchased by those in the public-labeling treatment was 12.4 shares or 35
percentage points (0.61 standard deviations) more than the controls.
The significance level of the coefficients for specifications 2 and 3 is robust. This
provides evidence that if I estimate the model for the first 6 meetings only, the treatment
effects are very strong for both interventions, although the point estimates are smaller. On
the other hand, estimating the ATE for the subsample with the same share price (P = COL
5,000) provides evidence of the effectiveness of the interventions for all individuals under
the same conditions. In this case, I isolate the possible heterogeneity in opportunities to
save across savings groups. The findings show that private commitment increases savings
by 25% while public commitment increases savings by 34%.
The last row shows the Chi squared-statistic corresponding to testing the joint
significance of the private vs. public treatment effect. The effect on savings of publicly
announcing savings goals is almost 50% larger than the effect of private commitments. The
point estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level in specifications (1) to (3).
Columns 4, 5 and 6 show the treatment effects for the total amount of money saved
over the savings cycle. This variable is constructed by multiplying the total number of
shares purchased during the savings cycle by the price of the share in the VSLAs where the
individual belongs. Interestingly the coefficients representing the ATE for the public and
private labeling interventions are insignificant in specifications 4 and 5. But once I isolate
the differences in share prices across savings groups (specification in column 6), the
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coefficients are significant for both interventions. As shown in column 6, the privatelabeling treatment increases savings balances during the first savings cycle by USD 22.5
while the public-labeling treatment increases savings balances by USD 31.1. These point
estimates represent an increase of 25% and 34% respectively. These results show that the
share price is important in predicting savings because it affects the behavior of individuals
by imposing constraints on their ability to save in the VSLA.
For some individuals the behavioral response to treatments runs up against institutional
features that restrict the optimal savings, such as the maximum of shares allowed to
purchase in each meeting, individuals can only buy an integer (0 to 5) number of shares and
the rigidity in share prices during the entire savings cycle. These restrictions are observed
when an individual is willing to purchase 1.5 instead of 2 shares and ends up purchasing a
single one, or in cases in which a participant is capable of purchasing more than 5 shares
but is only allowed a maximum of 5. As a result, individuals within a VSLA face different
constraints that depend not only on their own capability to raise money to make
contributions to the fund, but on the savings capability of other members and the rules set
in their own VSLA (mainly price shares).
To be more precise about the first constraint, individuals in VSLAs save exactly 0, 1P,
2P, 3P, 4P or 5P pesos during each meeting. This implies that the data is left, right and
'interval' censored, instead of observing the preferred level of savings, and that OLS
parameter estimates are biased, despite randomization of treatment status. For that reason, I
estimate a latent variable model, as shown in the following equations:
(3)

𝑆!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇! + 𝜀!
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(4)

𝑆!,!

0,                𝑖𝑓                𝑆!,! < 𝑃
𝑃, 𝑖𝑓      𝑃 ≤ 𝑆!,! < 2𝑃
2𝑃, 𝑖𝑓    2𝑃   ≤ 𝑆!,! < 3𝑃
=
3𝑃, 𝑖𝑓    3𝑃   ≤ 𝑆!,! < 4𝑃
4𝑃, 𝑖𝑓    4𝑃   ≤ 𝑆!,! < 5𝑃
5𝑃,                𝑖𝑓                𝑆!,! > 5𝑃

where SL,i corresponds to the underlying savings preference, Ti whether individual i
receives treatment or not, 𝜀! is an iid idiosyncratic disturbance term, SC,i represents the
observed level of savings and P the price of shares in each VSLA. Assuming that
individuals never exceed their latent savings preference and choose the highest available
savings level, the observed savings choices follow a step function such as:
(5)

𝑆!,! = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐

!!,!
!

∗𝑃

For example, suppose that the share price is $10, and an individual preference to save
is $5, then level of savings observed in the data is $0 because that individual purchase zero
shares. If instead, the latent savings preference is $27, the maximum number of shares that
can be purchased is 2, and the level of savings observed is $20. Similarly if the latent
savings is $100, the maximum number of shares that can be purchased in a session is 5,
therefore, the maximum level of savings per meeting is constrained to $50. These
individuals would be left censored, interval censored and right censored respectively. I use
an interval regression model to estimate the unbiased parameters that measure the effect of
the treatment interventions on saving using equation (6):
(6)

𝑆!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽! 𝑇!,! + 𝛽! 𝑇!,! + 𝜂!

where each observation of 𝑆!,! is an interval censored data, 𝑇!,! is a dummy for
private-labeling treated individuals and 𝑇!,! for public-labeling treated individuals. 𝜂! is an

78

idiosyncratic disturbance term. The results are shown in Table 6. The first panel shows the
estimations for savings per meeting. The results are consistent with the findings in previous
estimations. The effect of private-labeling treatment is insignificant, but the public-labeling
treatment is significant in explaining savings. However, the significance level drops even
for the public-labeling treatment when I cluster the data by VSLA.
I estimate the model using number of shares purchased as dependent variable. The
coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level for both treatment
interventions, indicating that labeling savings accounts privately and publicly increased the
number of shares purchased by an average of 0.65 and 0.75 shares per meeting. See Panel
B.77 The results from these estimations show that the treatment interventions are effective
in motivating the purchase of more shares in each meeting, but only public commitment is
able to explain changes in total savings.
Next, I explore the situation of individuals in all experimental groups pre and posttreatment intervention. I look at the share prices, the number of shares purchased in the first
meeting and the trends of savings over the entire savings cycle. The results show very
interesting patterns. Figure 1a depicts trends of the number of shares purchased during the
savings cycle by experimental groups. The graph shows that, on average, individuals
purchase the same number of shares in the first meeting, regardless of the subsequent
treatment status. But after the intervention, this number is increased for both private- and
public-labeling treatment groups relative to the control. The increase is noticeable larger for
the public-labeling treatment. After approximately meeting 9, public and private get closer

77

I also estimated the interval regression model including interactions of number of meetings with treatment
status for both savings per meeting and shares purchased per meeting; and also clustering by study site. The
treatment effects are robust to those specifications.
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together, reaching a similar level to those in the control group. These trends illustrate
potential positive treatment effects on the number of shares purchased as a result of the
interventions. For total savings, I plotted the cumulative savings for individuals during the
savings cycle in Figure 1b. It shows that average total savings are consistently larger for
those in the public-labeling treatment than those in the control group and private-labeling
treatment intervention. The latter is the lowest amongst all. This does not necessarily
implies that private commitment doesn’t work, but that there are other characteristics, such
as the share price, that should be incorporated in the analysis before making any
conclusions about individual savings behavior. For that reason, I need to do further analysis
of the differences in share prices across VSLAs, as described below.
Figure 2 plots the distribution of pre-treatment variables for each experimental group.
Panel A illustrates the distribution of share prices in all savings groups. Recall that the first
purchase of shares was performed prior to the interventions, which allows us to compare
the pre-treatment situation across experimental groups. There is a high frequency in the
price of shares at P = COP 5,000 (Colombian pesos, equivalent to approx. USD 2.8) across
all groups. This provides an opportunity to compare treatment effects at this price, when
individuals are more or less equally economically able to save. In the private-labeling
treatment, there is large concentration of prices below COP 3,000 (approx. USD 1.66)
relative to the other experimental groups, suggesting lower average share prices in this
treatment group. Panel B presents the frequency of savings groups according to the number
of shares bought only in the first meeting. The figure shows that on average individuals
purchased up to 2 shares in the first meeting.
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To explore further the statistical significance across experimental groups, I calculated
the average values of these measures for treatment and control groups. Table 7 shows that
the price of shares is statistically different for all experimental groups. The average share
prices are USD 2.30, USD 1.90 and USD 2.18 in the control, private-labeling treatment and
public-labeling treatment, respectively. This is consistent with what we observed in Figure
2, where the price of shares of VSLAs in the private-treatment intervention was
concentrated in lower values. Although these differences seem small, they are statistically
different from zero. This creates an imbalance in the pre-treatment variables but does not
invalidate the results, because as shown in Table 5, the results are mainly the same when I
estimate ATE for individuals under the same conditions (P = COP 5,000). However,
identifying these differences in prices helps to explain the sign of the private-labeling
treatment estimates when I estimate total savings balances. Differences in the price of
shares impose a restriction in the total amount of money saved throughout the savings
cycle, because no one can purchase more than 5 shares in each meeting. Even if individuals
in the private-labeling treatment purchase the maximum number of shares permitted in all
meetings, total savings would be smaller in comparison to the control and public-labeling
treatment groups, which have significantly higher share prices.
In terms of average number of shares purchased during the first meeting, I do not
observe any statistical difference across experimental groups. This indicates that,
conditional on share prices, individuals have a similar ability to save, on average. The last
rows of the table show statistically significant differences across experimental groups in the
total number of shares purchased and total savings balances under different scenarios.
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I also estimated the simple model that includes pre-treatment variables in the model in
order to control for imbalances in the sample prior to the intervention. The model estimated
is:
(7)

𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛽! 𝑇!,! + 𝛽! 𝑇!,! + 𝜸𝒊 𝑿𝒊 + 𝜇!

where 𝜸𝒊 is a vector of coefficients and 𝑿𝒊 a matrix of covariates, which include in the
regression the price of shares, dummies for facilitator and the number of shares purchased
in the first meeting.78 Table 8 displays the results of estimating equation (7). Columns 1, 2
and 3 show that estimating the total number of shares purchased in the savings cycle is
robust to including different covariates as controls. However, the private-labeling treatment
effect and the price of shares are insignificant. Columns 4, 5 and 6 show that controlling by
the share price, the treatment effect for individuals in the public-labeling intervention is
significant in explaining higher savings balances of about USD 18 more relative to the
controls. Average total savings of individuals in the control group is USD 82.52. Thus, the
point estimates predict an increase of 22% in total savings reaching out over USD 100 for
the public-labeling treatment. Treatment effects for the private-labeling intervention are
still insignificant but now the sign of the point estimates is positive. The results are similar
across specifications.79
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I included dummies for facilitator in order to control whether they have any influence in the determination
of share prices. The coefficient for 3 facilitators is significant, but for others, it is not statistically significant.
79
The statistical difference in the share prices across experimental groups may indicate an imbalance in the
pre-treatment characteristics of individuals. For that reason, I estimate the same model for total shares
purchased and total savings balances in each meeting starting from the first meeting (pre-intervention) until
meeting 7, for which I have disaggregated data. For the rest of the meetings (8 to end of cycle), I have
detailed data on purchase of shares for two thirds of the sample. For the remaining, I don’t have detailed data
per meeting but have the total number of shares purchased in the savings cycle. But all the individuals
included in the analysis comply with the treatment status. The results are shown in Table A1 in the Appendix.
The estimated treatment effects on the number of shares purchased are strong and significant for the publiclabeling treatment; and for the private-labeling treatment, the effects seem to be significant after some time of
exposure of the intervention. Surprisingly, the treatment effects on total savings are not significant for either
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To provide more evidence of the heterogeneity observed as a result of differences in
ability to save and share prices, Figure 3 plots the average number of shares purchased in
every meeting by experimental group and by the number of shares bought in the first
meeting. Individuals that, prior to the intervention, were more economically constrained
(purchased 0 to 2 shares in the first meeting) exhibited more difficulties to purchase a larger
amount of shares during the savings cycle, regardless of the treatment intervention
received, whereas those with more ability to save (purchased 3 to 5 shares prior to the
intervention) were more responsive to the treatment interventions, indicating differential
treatment effects for all types of individuals.80 As shown in the graphs, the trend in savings
is larger for individuals in the public-labeling treatment in all meetings. These pictures
provide evidence of potential heterogeneous treatment effects that I explore by estimating
the following model:
(8)

𝑌! = 𝛼 + 𝛽! 𝑇!,! + 𝛽! 𝑇!,! + 𝛿! 𝑇!,! ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝛿! 𝑇!,! ∗

𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! + 𝜁!
where 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛! represents a set of dummy variables of the number of shares
purchased in the first meeting by each individual. Results are reported in Table 9 and in
Table 10. Table 9 shows the coefficients of estimating equation (8) for the dependent
variables: total number of shares and total savings balance during the savings cycle. As in
the results for the first model the coefficients indicate that public-labeling treatment is very
strong and effective in increasing savings for all individuals, but are mixed for individuals
treatment intervention when I estimate the model meeting by meeting, implying that the price share is
definitely an important factor in the causal effect of the treatment on the treated subjects.
80
Despite that I don’t find any difference in the characteristics of these households across experimental
groups, the term “economically constrained” is assigned to individuals exclusively based on the number of
shares purchased prior to treatment. A more detailed analysis should be done to prove that these households
are in fact more disadvantaged and, therefore, less able to save.
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in the private-labeling intervention. In order to see this more clearly, I calculated the joint
significance of the total treatment effects for each type of individuals. The computations
suggest that the private-labeling intervention significantly increases savings accumulations
for those who initially bought 3 or 5 shares. For all other types of individuals, the treatment
effect is positive but insignificant. This result can be illustrated in a graph. Figure 4 depicts
the heterogeneous treatment effects estimated above for the total number of shares
purchased (left panel) and total savings in US dollars (right panel). The effect of public
commitment on total shares bought during the savings cycle is strongly significant and
increases monotonically for individuals that purchase 1 or more shares in the first meeting,
whereas the impact of private commitment fluctuates along the different levels of ability to
save; however it’s increasing and significant only for those that begin the savings cycle
purchasing 3 or 5 shares. On the other hand, the public and private treatment interventions
increase total savings but are significant only for individuals who, pre-intervention, are less
economically constrained.
The findings show that setting a soft commitment to save is highly effective in
increasing savings accumulations for individuals without economic restrictions or with
some ability or motivation to save, prior to the intervention. Yet, when adding peer affects
to commitment, the economic restriction does not prevent all individuals from increasing
savings accumulations.
The institutional features of the program, such as the limit in the number of shares
purchased in each meeting by each member or the fact that individuals can only purchase
discrete amounts of shares, may be underestimating the true effects of the treatment on
savings. In order to explore further this idea, I estimated a non-linear model in two steps: In
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the first step, I estimate the probability of purchasing each discrete number of shares
allowed in the first meeting (0 to 5) as a function of group variables (including dummies for
city and facilitator). This estimation can be observed as an approximation to model the
institutional constraints imposed by the program, and allows estimating the underlying
savings of individuals. In the second step, I estimate the average treatment effects on
savings accumulations, measured with various outcomes. The results are reported in Tables
11 and 12. The estimations show that the decision of the number of shares to purchase in
the first meeting is determined by group variables such as the value of the social fund and
the municipality that also describes the facilitator of the VSLA. The facilitator plays an
important role in determining the number of shares that participants purchase in the
beginning of the savings cycle. Surprisingly, the share price is unrelated to this decision, at
least in the first meeting. These results indicate that individuals make their choices
following the dynamics of the group rather than their own, financial or behavioral,
constraints, at least in the beginning.
In the second step, I use the predicted probability of choosing 0 to 5 shares to purchase
in the first meeting as a measure of the institutional constraints that participants may face
when making the savings decisions. I estimate average treatment effects on savings
accumulations controlling for other explanatory variables (see Table 12). The results are
consistent with previous findings (Tables 5 and 8), where public commitment strongly
affects the total number of shares purchased in the savings cycle with and without including
the share prices a control. On the other hand, private commitment is positive but
insignificant. Interestingly, the variables that measures the institutional constraints faced in
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the VSLAs are positive and statistically significant in explaining all different measures of
savings accumulations; and support the findings from previous estimations.

Treatment effects on goal achievement:
The last set of calculations exhibit the effects of the interventions on goal achievement.
First, I calculated the impact on goal achievement using data from the baseline survey. At
that point, I asked all subjects what they wanted to use their savings from the first savings
cycle for. I compared this information with the responses from the follow-up survey. The
results show that public commitment highly affects achievement. See Table 13. However,
the impact is not statistical significant in the case of private commitment. This result is
robust to all specifications, even when I condition the achievement of goals with the
initially established goal and I add municipality level control.
In the second estimation I estimate goal achievement, but now I compare the responses
in the follow-up survey with the information reported at the intervention sessions. In other
words, this specification compares the effect across treatments (excluding the control
group). The coefficients are significant at the 5% and indicate an increase of 9.8 percentage
points in the likelihood of goal achievement for individuals in the public-labeling treatment
relative to those in the private-labeling treatment group.
Qualitative results:
The purpose of the qualitative analysis is to explore further the behavior of treated
individuals after exposure of the intervention and to identify whether the interventions
contributed somehow to the way participants earmarked transactions and, as a result,
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change consumption and savings choices. I performed 4 focus groups discussions at two
sites of the study and explored the experience of participants in the following: (i) savings as
a member of VSLA, (ii) the savings goals, (iii) challenges in reaching goals, (iv) dynamics
within VSLAs, and (v) social taxation among members of the group.
Individuals reported that before being part of VSLAs their level of savings was very
small, irregular, mostly informal and used frequently in unnecessary spending, despite of
understanding that savings is a mechanism to reaching goals, smoothing consumption and
facing difficult times in the future. Participants informed us that sharing publicly their
savings goals created a competitive environment within the group that motivated each other
to making greater effort to save a larger amount of money. In all cases individuals put
pressure from one another to buy shares, actively participate in group activities and achieve
commitments. In a few situations the group penalized members who were not making
regular contributions.
In terms of savings goals, men were more likely to set long run savings goals that
required more funds and possibly other sources of funding than the savings from the group.
Women set goals that were more feasible and easier to achieve, but were more like to reach
those goals. The most common motivations to reaching goals were personal challenge,
pressure from the VLSA members (mainly to purchase the maximum number of shares)
and family-related goals (make it less likely to deviate).
During the discussion sessions I found out evidence of social taxes in two contexts:
First, individuals penalize VSLA members that failed to contribute to the savings fund or
failed to comply with the rules of conduct. Second, at the household level I found that men
usually tease their wives and underestimate their ability to save at the beginning of the
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savings cycle; but once they realize their engagement with savings, husbands reduced the
money transferred to their wives for household expenses because women are now able to
raise money on their own. These statements provide some insights to study further the
dynamic created at the household level as a result of changes in individual’s savings
behavior.

4.6.

CONCLUSION

I designed and implemented a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) to study how two
modifications of a commitment savings product, in which individuals open private or
publicly a ‘mental savings account’, affect savings decisions of low-income individuals that
participate in newly formed VSLAs in Colombia.
The results show that labeling ‘mental savings accounts’ is effective in increasing
savings for different types of individuals. The RCT demonstrates very strong and
significant results for treated individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings
increased by more than 30 percentage points (effect size of up to .38 standard deviations)
and individuals were at least 8.5% more likely to achieve the initially established savings
goals. The results for the private-labeling treatment intervention are very interesting also.
The effect on savings is heterogeneous and depends on intrinsic characteristics of
individuals and on institutional restrictions imposed by the VSLA methodology. However,
the impact on goal achievement is statistically irrelevant.
The results also provide evidence that treatment effects are very significant for
individuals who save larger amounts of money in the beginning of the VSLA savings cycle;
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but are insignificant for individuals with lower savings in the beginning of the cycle. Using
a model that estimates the underlying savings of individuals using an interval regression
model and a 2-step procedure, I show that treatment effects are strong and significant for
public-labeling treated subjects and insignificant for private-labeling subjects. Also, the
models shows that the institutional constraints imposed by the methodology and
characteristics of the savings groups affect the savings decisions of individuals. For that
reason, individuals experience different abilities to respond to the treatment interventions
depending not only on their own behavior but also on the institutional features of the VSLA
program.
In terms of goal achievement, individuals in the public-labeling treatment are more
likely to use other sources of income flows, such as investments and loans to achieve
savings goals. This could be explained by the fear to be punished by other members of the
VSLA if they fail to meet their promises.
Self-help groups such as VSLA are an alternative to poor and extremely poor
households to help them manage financial assets and smooth consumption. Creating
commitments exogenously enable individuals to think about strategies to improve the use
of assets and financial decisions in the future in order to maximize their utility. This
intervention translates recent theoretical insights into experimental strategies implemented
in the field to both test the theory and possibly improve the impacts of a large-scale public
policy program. The methodology represents a new approach to the study of individual
behavior and provides valuable insights and information to program administrators and
policy makers involved in the design and diffusion of commitment-savings products. The
increased availability of these and other products with similar features may serve to
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increase savings, improve financial literacy amongst poor households, which may
contribute to generate income to fight poverty.
The results from the quantitative and qualitative analysis in this study open additional
questions that are subject of future research. Some ideas that arise form this study are: to
explore how does the change in savings habits affect other behavior at the household and
community level. Some potential outcomes to analyze are the bargaining power within the
household, the participation in social and community activities, social penalties and
rewards to savings behavior, etc. Also, further analysis should be done in terms of
heterogeneous treatment effects for men vs. women, young vs. adults, and for long vs. short
run commitments.
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Table 1. Experimental sample

Experimental groups
(VSLA)

Treated Individuals

Experimental subjects
(household survey)

Administrative data

Public
Private
Control
Total
Public
Private
Total
Public
Private
Control
Total
Public
Private
Control

Bolivar
13
13
12
38
128
139
267
65
67
57
189
143
149
104
396

Choco Cundi-Boyaca
15
19
15
17
14
19
44
55
131
196
135
174
266
370
73
91
75
76
70
96
218
263
179
256
183
231
166
252
528
739

Total
47
45
45
137
455
448
903
229
218
223
670
578
563
522
1663

Total
Source: survey data, administrative records. Notes: The first panel contains the number of VSLAs that were
subject of the experiment; the second shows the number of individuals exposed to the treatment intervention
(recall that the control group is not exposed to the treatment intervention, but only to the VSLA methodology);
panel 3 details the number of individuals randomly chosen to be interviewed to administered the households
survey; and panel 4 summarizes the total number of individuals in the experimental sample and for which I
have administrative records on savings.

Table 2. Power calculations
Min. Observations

Min. Clusters per site

Experiment 1. Public vs. Control, MDE = 0.3 sd
702
6
Rho=0.05
819
7
Rho=0.15
1053
9
Rho=0.25
Experiment 2. Public vs. Private, MDE = 0.2 sd
1287
11
Rho=0.05
1755
15
Rho=0.15
Rho=0.25
2223
19
Note: Author’s calculations using a Multi-site cluster randomized model at the individual level with Optimal
Design software. Results are verified using Stata commands sampsi and sampclus with savings data from the
pilot of the VSLA program in Colombia.
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Table 3. Baseline comparison of covariates across experimental groups
Untreated
(CTRL)
4.72
0.77
1.80
0.69
0.62
0.04
0.27
7.1
0.49
0.67
0.17
0.03
0.39
0.4
0.53
0.66
0.09
3.39
13.60

Public
(U)
4.72
0.82
1.76
0.65
0.66
0.04
0.27
6.4
0.50
0.64
0.16
0.07
0.35
0.4
0.48
0.62
0.11
3.36
13.57

Private
(R)
4.55
0.78
1.48
0.64
0.58
0.04
0.33
5.4
0.49
0.61
0.13
0.03
0.33
0.4
0.50
0.63
0.14
3.49
13.56

Household size
% female
Number of children (<16 yrs of age) at home
% married
% CCT recipient
% receive cash & in-kind transfers (elderly)
% households that hold any type of savings
Weekly savings (USD)
% households with a bank account
% open bank account to receive CCT
% had loan in last year
% households that write a budget
% made an investment last year
% with paid job
% independent
% own home
% participate in community organizations
Trust in banks and financial institutions
Size of the VSLA
Perception that household could save…:
Much more
0.36
0.37
0.40
More
0.32
0.36
0.32
The same
0.16
0.08
0.10
Nothing
0.16
0.18
0.18
Pearson's chi-squared
7.29
P-value:
0.29
Number of observations
223
229
218
Number of VSLAs
45
47
45
Source: Baseline household survey. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.

Mean Diff Mean Diff Mean Diff
(CTRL-U) (CTRL-R)
(R-U)
0.008
0.174
-0.166
-0.053
-0.014
-0.039
0.040
0.32**
-0.28**
0.038
0.046
-0.008
-0.034
0.043
-0.077*
-0.004
0.000
-0.003
-0.008
-0.064
0.056
0.750
1.750
-1.000
-0.014
0.000
-0.014
0.028
0.056
-0.028
0.006
0.037
-0.031
-0.033
0.000
-0.033
0.036
0.055
-0.019
-0.029
0.036
-0.065
0.047
0.024
0.023
0.037
0.032
0.005
-0.020
-0.049
0.029
0.027
-0.106
0.134
0.035
0.039
-0.004
-0.008
-0.045
0.073
-0.020

-0.035
0.001
0.056
-0.022

Table 4. Savings commitments
Savings goals
(percentages)
Home
Education
Investment
Consumption of non-durables
Consumption of durables
Pay debt
Unexpected expense
Other
Biweekly savings (No. of shares)
Biweekly savings (USD)
Would like to take a loan
Number of participants

Private-labeling
Mean
43
25
28
8
7
1
4
2
3.06
5.94
15
448

Public-labeling
Mean
t-statistic
34
1.71
22
0.53
25
0.64
16
-2.15
12
-1.47
2
-1.34
3
0.32
3
0.33
3.1
-0.24
6.93
-2.92
10
2.22
455

Source: Treatment interventions. T-statistic calculated from the mean difference of averages between groups
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0.027
-0.046
0.017
0.002

Table 5. Treatment effects on savings
Number of Shares Bought
Savings Balance
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
First 6
p=COL
First 6
p=COL
Total
Total
meetings
$5,000
meetings
$5,000
Private tmt
6.03*
1.99*
8.12*
-5.764
-2.07
22.55*
(3.45)
(1.01)
(4.5)
(11.72)
(4.05)
(12.51)
Public tmt
12.35***
3.26***
11.19**
14.11
3.12
31.09**
(3.47)
(1.113)
(4.58)
(11.19)
(3.68)
(12.71)
Constant
35.03***
12.83*** 32.72*** 82.53*** 29.79***
90.9***
(2.02)
(.722)
(1.9)
(8.702)
2.96
(5.27)
Observations
1474
1474
654
1474
1474
654
Chi2 for (Public=Private)
10.76
8.46
7.85
0.18
0.02
7.85
Source: Administrative data. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.

Table 6. Interval regression results
A. Savings per meeting (USD)
Coef. Std. Err.
Coef. Robust SE (VSLA)
Private
0.02 (0.137)
0.02
(0.980)
Public
1.14 (0.133) *** 1.14
(0.919)
Constant
6.75 (0.096) *** 6.75
(0.767) ***
Observations
19,555
B. Number of shares bought per meeting
Coef. Std. Err.
Coef. Robust SE (VSLA)
Private
0.56 (0.059) *** 0.56
(0.322) *
Public
0.72 (0.058) *** 0.72
(0.343) **
Constant
2.27 (0.042) *** 2.27
(0.224) ***
Observations
19,555
Source: Administrative data. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 7. Pre- and Post-treatment averages for savings outcomes
Share price (USD)
Shares purchased first meeting
Total shares
All
First 6 meetings
P = COL $5,000
Total savings (USD)
All
First 6 meetings
P = COL $5,000

Control (C) Private (R) Public (U) C-R C-U R-U
2.30
1.90
2.18
***
* ***
1.78
1.82
1.75
35.03
12.83
32.72

41.06
14.83
40.84

47.39
16.09
43.92

82.53
29.79
90.90

76.76
27.71
113.45

96.64
32.91
121.99

Source: Administrative data. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
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***
***
***

***
***
***

***
**

***
***

***

***
**
***

Table 8. Treatment effects with controls
Total shares
Total savings balance
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Private tmt
5.11
4.92
5.08
7.91
8.49
7.85
(3.49)
(3.37)
(3.33)
(7.05)
(7.11)
(6.68)
Public tmt
12.15***
11.28**
12.39***
18.12*
18.43*
18.64*
(3.41)
(3.417)
(3.25)
(8.67)
(8.44)
(8.26)
Share price
-2.30
0.19
-1.81
34.23*** 37.64*** 35.24***
(1.71)
(1.83)
(1.549)
(6.03)
(7.24)
(5.74)
Shares meeting 1
6.70***
13.78***
(.58)
(1.418)
Constant
40.32***
32.51***
27.24***
3.92
-6.1
-22.96
(4.53)
(6.09)
(4.11)
(13.35)
(15.06)
(12.58)
Includes facilitator dummies
X
X
Observations
1474
1474
1474
1474
1474
1474
Chi2 for (Public=Private)
8.81
8.00
9.45
3.76
4.10
4.08
Source: Administrative data. Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Specifications (2) and (5) include facilitator dummies as controls. All regressions also include dummies for
municipalities or study sites.
Dependent variable:

Table 9. Heterogeneous treatment effects
Dependent variable

Total shares

Total savings

Coeff.
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Std. Err.
(3.49) -4.464
(6.95)
Private tmt
-2.231
Public tmt
7.689*
(3.22)
10.3
(7.75)
Private tmt*1 share dummy
0.221
(3.37) -0.485
(7.47)
Private tmt*2 shares dummy
5.892*
(2.9) 12.19*
(5.13)
Private tmt*3 shares dummy 21.44***
(5.95) 30.85***
(8.85)
Private tmt*4 shares dummy
9.652*
(4.09)
13.38
(7.72)
Private tmt*5 shares dummy 32.61***
(5.95) 57.97*** (11.57)
Public tmt*1 share dummy
-6.413*
(2.69) -16.66**
(6.29)
Public tmt*2 shares dummy
6.498
(3.8)
15.71
(8.78)
Public tmt*3 shares dummy
18.53**
(5.48) 38.04**
(12.18)
Public tmt*4 shares dummy 29.81***
(7.13) 82.17*** (20.64)
Public tmt*5 shares dummy 30.05***
(2.99) 59.14***
(9.8)
Share price (USD)
-1.3806
(1.39) 28.92***
(7.21)
Avge share first meeting
3.262*
(1.44)
Avge savings (USD)
4.471*
(1.95)
Constant
32.39***
(4.8) -1.949
(10.31)
Number of observations
1474
1474
Source: Administrative data. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis.
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Table 10. Total heterogeneous treatment effects
Mean for Control group
0 shares in first meeting
1 share in first meeting
2 shares in first meeting
3 shares in first meeting
4 shares in first meeting
5 shares in first meeting
Total effects^
0 shares in first meeting
1 share in first meeting
2 shares in first meeting
3 shares in first meeting
4 shares in first meeting
5 shares in first meeting

Total shares

Total savings (USD)

30.0
73.8
28.6
66.2
37.7
90.1
43.1
105.9
41.7
112.8
50.7
101.3
Total shares
Total savings (USD)
Private Public
Private
Public
27.7
37.7 **
69.3
84.1
26.6
29.9 *** 61.2
59.8
41.4
51.9 *** 97.8
116.1 **
62.3 *** 69.4 *** 132.3 *** 154.2 ***
49.1
79.2 *** 121.8
205.3 ***
81.1 *** 88.4 *** 154.8 *** 170.8 ***

Source: Administrative data. Joint significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
Notes: ^ These numbers are calculated using the coefficients from estimating the heterogeneous treatment
effects from model 2. Robust standard errors are used in the estimation.

Table 11. Step 1: Ordered probit to estimate the probability of purchasing a discrete
number of shares in the first meeting
Depvar: Shares bought in first meeting (0 to 5)
Size of savings group
% female in the group
Share price (USD)
Value of social fund (USD)
Facilitator 2 (Istmina)
Facilitator 3 (Pacho)
Facilitator 4 (Quibdo)
Facilitator 5 (Sogamoso)
Facilitator 6 (Tado)
Facilitator 7 (Ubate)
Facilitator 8 (Zipaquira)
Facilitator 9 (Cartagena)
Facilitator 10 (Cartagena)
Facilitator 11 (Cartagena)
Facilitator 12 (Cartagena)
Cut 1
Cut 2
Cut 3
Cut 4
Cut 5
Observations

Coefficient
0.02
0.07
0.00
0.00
**
-0.30
-0.20
-0.44
**
-0.63
***
-0.23
-0.01
-0.19
-0.06
-0.29
-0.48
**
-0.53
*
-0.70
0.30
0.84
1.06
1.29

Std. Err.
(0.015)
(0.063)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.208)
(0.175)
(0.201)
(0.186)
(0.275)
(0.203)
(0.216)
(0.236)
(0.279)
(0.206)
(0.283)
(0.250)
(0.244)
(0.249)
(0.246)
(0.249)
1,474

Notes: * indicates significance level at the 90%, ** at the 95% and *** at the 99%. In total, the experiment
was conducted in 9 municipalities with one facilitator per location. However, in Cartagena there were 4
facilitators in total. The table shows the facilitator effect on the probability of purchasing 0 through 5 shares
in the first meeting as well as the effect of other group variables. Facilitator 10 is omitted.
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Table 12. Step 2: Treatment effects on savings accumulations with and without controls
Average shares per
Total savings
meeting
Total shares
(USD)
Private treatment
0.28
4.96
7.63
(0.203)
(3.362)
(6.819)
Public treatment
0.54*
12.44***
18.81*
(0.234)
(3.242)
(8.232)
Residual
-0.20
-2.44
-5.67
(0.122)
(1.740)
(4.390)
Residual^2
0.06*
0.78*
1.48
(0.023)
(0.314)
(0.772)
Shares bought in meeting 1
0.53***
7.95***
16.96***
(0.132)
(1.868)
(4.768)
Share price (USD)
-0.07
-1.58
35.67***
(0.100)
(1.512)
(5.643)
Constant
1.40***
22.99***
-32.51*
(0.308)
(4.997)
(13.050)
Observations
1,107
1,474
1,474
Chi2 (private=public)
4.83
9.06
3.89
Chi2 (all)
32.7
38.86
31.25
Notes: * indicates significance level at the 90%, ** at the 95% and *** at the 99%.

Table 13. Treatment effects on goal achievement
Goal achievement
depvar:
Achieved savings goal (BL)

Robust SE
Mean control Public
Private
0.159 0.085**
0.013
-(0.04)
-(0.04)
Achieved savings goal (TMT)
0.098***
-(0.05)
Number of observations
670

Robust SE + controls
Public
Private
0.098***
0.032
-(0.04)
-(0.04)
0.064
-(0.05)

Source: Baseline and end line household survey. Significance levels: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. I use Baseline
goals as controls
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Figure 1a. Trend of the number of share purchased over the entire savings cycle
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Source: Administrative data.

Figure 1b. Cumulative total savings per meeting by experimental group
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Figure 2.a. Pre-treatment variables: Share prices
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Source: Administrative data.

Figure 2.a. Pre-treatment variables: Shares bought in first meeting
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Figure 3. Trends of shares purchased in each meeting by number of shares bought in the
first meeting
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Figure 4. Total heterogeneous effects on savings
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Appendix A1. Treatment effects estimated for each meeting
Regression
for:
Meeting 1

Total shares
Total savings (USD)
Private TMT Public TMT Constant Private TMT Public TMT
Constant Obs.
0.034
-0.028
1.784 ***
-0.595
-0.361
4.044 *** 1474
(0.18)
(0.18)
(0.13)
(0.58)
(0.49)
(0.38)
Meeting 2
0.191
0.697 *** 2.100 ***
-0.724
0.793
4.942 *** 1474
(0.18)
(0.20)
(0.14)
(0.61)
(0.61)
(0.49)
Meeting 3
0.410 **
0.794 *** 2.166 ***
-0.235
0.882
5.143 *** 1474
(0.20)
(0.24)
(0.16)
(0.80)
(0.74)
(0.59)
Meeting 4
0.326
0.611 ** 2.323 ***
-0.536
0.727
5.295 *** 1474
(0.24)
(0.24)
(0.18)
(0.73)
(0.72)
(0.59)
Meeting 5
0.326
0.577 ** 2.262 ***
-0.285
0.443
5.271 *** 1474
(0.21)
(0.22)
(0.14)
(0.84)
(0.72)
(0.59)
Meeting 6
0.709 *** 0.606 *** 2.199 ***
0.303
0.638
5.092 *** 1474
(0.23)
(0.23)
(0.17)
(0.84)
(0.76)
(0.64)
Meeting 7
0.550 **
0.618 ** 2.155 ***
-0.124
0.630
5.218 *** 1474
(0.25)
(0.24)
(0.17)
(0.84)
(0.83)
(0.66)
Notes: * indicates significance level at the 90%, ** at the 95% and *** at the 99%. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis. I estimated each regression until meeting 7 because I only have detailed information about the
number of shares bought per person per meeting for the entire sample until meeting 7. After meeting 7, I only
have data for one third of the sample.

100

Chapter 5: Does saving more help people make
better choices? Experimental evidence from VSLAs
in Colombia
5.1.

INTRODUCTION

Although saving behavior of individuals has been studied widely in the economics
literature, the main concern of researchers has been to illustrate the factors that determine
savings and how to increase savings behavior among individuals as a strategy to smooth
consumption over time. According to Modigliani’s life-cycle hypothesis, individuals save
to maintain a stable and relatively constant level of consumption over their entire lifetime.
These studies have tested the determinants of savings using individual as well as
aggregated data.81
However, little evidence has been offered about the relationship of savings and
variables that measure other types of behavior. Most studies analyze the effects of savings
on aggregate variables such as economic growth. In an attempt to provide signals on the
causality of savings on individual behavior, this essay uses experimental evidence about
how a saving-promoting intervention may affect individual behavior such as bargaining
power in the household, changes in the composition of households’ expenditures, food
security, trust and perception.
The results offer some suggestions that help answer questions and concerns such as
why do policymakers and researchers care about people's preferences for consumption? Or
81

See Modigliani (1966), Carroll et al (1994), Deaton (2005) and Guven (2012).
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why do we want to help individuals save more or to participate more in the decisions in the
household? Or as in Thaler & Sunstein´s “libertarian paternalism” discussion, why we want
to push individuals into certain directions to help them make better decisions?82
In this essay, I address part of these questions by providing evidence of behavioral
changes of individuals that participate in a Randomized Controlled Trial in which
participants label mental savings accounts created in two different settings. First, they set a
savings goal and label their Village Saving and Loan Association (VSLA) savings account
in a private or individual setting. Second, individuals label their VSLA savings account
individually, but then publicly announce to other members of the group their savings goal.
This intervention starts with a trust building game that motivates cooperative behavior.83 In
this way individuals create private and public commitments to reaching savings goals. I
also observe and follow a control group in which individuals participate in VSLAs during
the same period of time, but do not set explicitly any savings goal. The hypothesis tested by
under this setting is whether individuals save more when they save for a, private or public,
declared purpose, and if this pro-savings behavior is influences the change in other
behaviors.
In the paper Public vs. Private Mental Accounts: Experimental Evidence from Savings
Groups in Colombia I provide evidence about the impact of labeling mental savings
accounts on savings for individuals that participate in VSLAs.84 In this essay, I want to test
whether this savings-promoting intervention has an impact on other outcomes that describe

82

Thaler and Sunstein (2009).
The game is called “Game with balloons” in which each member of a VSLA is asked to maintain a balloon
in the air while everybody is walking around a room. Then more balloons are added and all participants are
responsible for keeping all balloons in the air, regardless of whether its their own balloon or of another
member.
84
Salas (2014).
83
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the behavior of individuals in the decision-making or bargaining power in within the
household, expenditures, food security, trust, etc. I explore various measures of these
variables in the analysis using data collected from household surveys conducted in the RCT
at two points in time. During the baseline, I collected demographic characteristics of the
households, as well as data on income, expenditures, experience with financial services,
trust and general perception in different hypothetical situations. One year after the
treatment intervention, I followed the same individuals and collected data in order to
explore changes in savings and other outcomes after being exposed to the intervention for
at least one savings cycle (8 months).
Using measures of different behaviors the results show that labeling savings accounts
are an effective strategy to improve discretionary spending in some household
expenditures, trust and perception; but is unable to change the bargaining power within the
household or improve food security of adults and children. Some of this may have a direct
relationship with a change in savings behavior that was obtained in Salas 2014. However, it
is not possible to unravel if the change in individuals’ behavior is the result of the treatment
intervention by itself or through savings. The test in this paper was motivated by anecdotal
evidence shared by participants in focus group discussions that I held during the RCT. In
those sessions, participants shared their experience in the savings group and with their
families at home during the period of the study.
On the other hand, the dynamics created in the savings groups also motivates exploring
behavioral changes of those who participate and may reinforce the effect of the treatment
interventions, in particular the public commitment. This is, the collective nature of the
VSLA methodology may imply that individuals have the opportunity to know each other,
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share their dreams, etc. For example, sharing their savings goals with each other creates
social pressure that make individuals behave in different ways.

5.2.

DOES

LABELING A SAVINGS ACCOUNT STIMULATE CHANGES IN
OTHER BEHAVIORS ?

To answer his question, I estimate an OLS regression to test the direct impact of the
treatment interventions on different outcomes of interest, using the following equation:
(1)

𝑦! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛼! 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐! + 𝜖!

where 𝑦! is the outcome variable that represents different behaviors such as trust,
decision-making in the household, discretionary spending, etc. The variables Private and
Public are dummies that measure participation in the private and public labeling treatment
interventions, respectively; 𝛼! and 𝛼! measure the impact of each intervention on the
variable of interest 𝑦! ; and 𝜖! is the individual’s exogenous unobserved variation in the
model.
This model allows testing if different savings-promoting interventions have an impact
on changes in the behavior of individuals related with inter-temporal decision-making.

5.3.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA AND OUTCOME VARIABLES

Data:
During July of 2011 to December of 2012 I implemented an RCT in which I randomly
assigned newly formed VSLAs to two treatments and one control group in 9 municipalities
of Colombia to test whether different ways in which individuals label their mental savings
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accounts, affect savings accumulations. 85 In this essay I use various sources of data
collected in the RCT. I use data from a baseline survey administered to 670 households in
the experimental sample. This survey measures a set of individual and household
characteristics such as demographic variables, use and experience of financial services,
food security, household income and expenditures, social capital, ability to cope with
unexpected shocks, etc.
The second-stage surveying was administered one year later, when I followed the same
group of individuals interviewed at baseline. Attrition rate was less than 3% of the
sample.86 Finally, I use administrative records of the program that collect information on
savings in each of the meetings of VSLA members.87 I match these records with individual
and household characteristics from baseline and follow-up in order to estimate the effect of
private and public commitments on several individuals’ conduct outcomes.
Treatment interventions:
VSLAs are informal community-based arrangements that promote savings and provide
access to low-cost loans for low-income individuals. In 2011, the Colombian government
decided to expand the program to conform at least 600 new VSLAs in different regions of
the country. I used this expansion to run an RCT and test whether labeling savings accounts
in different contexts has an impact on savings behavior of participants. The RCT assigned
newly formed VSLAs to three experimental groups and all individuals in a VSLA received
the same intervention to its peers at the same VSLA: (i) Individuals in the control group are

85

For more details on this study, go to http://luzsalas.ws.gc.cuny.edu/files/2014/03/JMPaper-v.5.pdf.
In total, 19 individuals were not possible to interview during follow-up: 16 from the control group and 9
from the private-labeling treatment group.
87
Administrative data comes from two sources: IED/Vital and Plan International which are the implementing
organizations of the VSLAs in Colombia.
86
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exposed to the standard VSLA model which uses a well-scripted model to organize eligible
beneficiaries, and allows individuals to save and borrow for any group-approved purpose.
(ii) Individuals in the private-labeling treatment group are subject to an added discussion
module aimed at highlighting and discussing the difficulties of committing to a savings
path and the potential role of using mental accounts in strengthening those commitments.
The session ended by asking members to voluntarily state in writing a savings purpose and
weekly savings goals. In the private-labeling treatment individuals create (open) and label
their mental “savings” account that may contribute to higher savings rates. (iii) The publiclabeling treatment intervention is similar except that it encouraged members to make
commitments both to themselves and to others in their group, which may let me explore the
possibility that this might lead to different outcomes. This module starts with trust-building
games and a guided conversation aimed at highlighting the achievements of group
commitments.88 As in the private-labeling treatment, members were asked to voluntarily
state a savings purpose and a weekly savings goal in writing, but in this intervention those
commitments were also shared with all members of the group. By doing this, individuals
explicitly label their mental account and publicly commit to their own decision.
As explained in Salas (2014), people often find it valuable and practical to form mental
accounts as a commitment device to constrain their behavior; therefore, individuals may
save more money when they save for a declared purpose. In addition, at the same time that
savings behavior is changed, these interventions may affect the behavior of individuals
when making other decisions. This is the case when individuals change their consumption
patterns and decide to spend less in the consumption of temptation goods or decide to use

88

The footnote 3 above explains the trust-building game performed in the public-labeling intervention.
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their time to participate more in community organizations or in deciding whether to send
children to school or to work, etc. From the public policy perspective studying changes in
these behaviors could be useful in terms of designing interventions to improve the welfare
of individuals and the dynamics in their households and communities.
Outcome variables:
I selected a set of variables to estimate behavioral changes of individuals that
participated in the study (Salas, 2014) that can be classified in the following topics: (i)
household decision-making, (ii) unnecessary spending; (iii) food security; (iv) occupation
and job related variables; (v) social capital (trust and perception). I constructed different
measures for each of these topics.
Although these survey questions are commonly used in many studies, some of them
can be measured incorrectly or are subject to common survey problems such as ambiguity,
subjectivity, etc. Without this limitation, I would have been able to calculate unbiased
estimates of the variables that measure the change in behavior of individuals as a result of
being exposed to private or public commitment.
i.

Household decision-making: measures whether the respondent participates in making
most of the decisions in the household during follow-up relative to her participation
at baseline.89

ii.

Unnecessary spending: I used subjective and objective measures of unnecessary
spending. First, during the follow-up survey I asked respondents if they believed

89

The questions asks who makes most of the decisions in the household regarding regular spending, other
spending, social events and celebrations, saving, investment, children expenditures and other expenditures. I
collapsed these indicators into a single variable that calculates the number of decisions in which she
participates. (Glennerster and Takavarasha, 2013).
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their household expenditure in unnecessary consumption goods improved or worsen
(subjective). Second, I asked individuals at baseline and follow-up surveys to list the
items that the household spent more than necessary (fast food, tea, coffee,
entertainment, groceries, utility bills, tobacco, alcoholic beverages, social events,
debt, clothing, etc.). I classified the responses in dummy variables for each spending
category and then compared their responses at each point in time.90
iii.

Food security: I use an aggregated measure of food insecurity if an individual lives
in a household that had any type of problems getting enough food in the 30 days
prior to the survey. If the household does not have the same problem during followup, the indicator variable improves food insecurity takes the value of 1. I also use
measures of improvement in food insecurity for adults and children.91

iv.

Social capital: I use a series of questions typically asked about trust in other
individuals and institutions.92 In a scale from 1 to 5, respondents have to rate their
level of trust in each category. I use this information to construct two types of
indicators: I demean the response of individuals after exposure of treatment
intervention for each category and construct a measure of trust for each one. Second,
I compare the level of trust of individuals before and after intervention and report
whether individuals are more trusting in each category. The regression results only
illustrate the estimations with the first set of indicators. But the results are available

90

For example, if an individual at baseline considered that the household spent more than necessary in fast
food the dummy for unnecessary spending of fast food takes a value of 1. If at follow-up respond that didn’t
spend more than necessary, the dummy takes the value of cero. Then when I compare these two dummy
indicators, the variable improved in unnecessary spending takes the value of 1.
91
The questions asked in the survey are: In the last 30 days, did any adult in your household had to reduce the
amount of food or number of meals a day because didn´t have of enough money? And, In the last 30 days, did
any child in your household had to reduce the amount of food or number of meals a day because didn´t have
of enough money?
92
See Glaeser et al (2000).
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upon request. To measure perception, I use various questions about the general
perception of fairness, cooperation and trustfulness of people in general, happiness
and safety in their neighborhood and the general situation of their families. 93

5.4.

RESULTS

Table 1 summarizes the OLS estimates of model (1). Each row represents the
regression estimations for each single outcome variable. Columns 1, 3 and 5 display the
OLS coefficients of the private, public treatment and constant, respectively, and columns 2,
4, and 6 show the robust standard errors. The last column presents the number of
observations of each regression. I grouped the variables of interest in 5 panels.
Panel A shows the results for the outcomes that measure trust. Commitment to a
particular savings purpose in a VSLA context increases the level of trust in relatives and
friends. In particular, the coefficient of the private-labeling treatment is statistically
significant (at 5% level) in explaining an increase in 0.54 points the level of trust in friends
(in a scale from 1 to 5) in comparison with those individuals in the control group. Also,
increases significantly the level of trust in the school system by 0.26 points.
On the other hand, if individuals share public their savings goal, the level of trust in
relatives (extended family) increases in about 0.52 points and its is statistically significant
at the 10% level. Interestingly, public-labeling intervention also affects significantly the
trust in community organizations, but the sign of the coefficient is negative, possibly
because these savings groups are managed and organized by community members such as
friends and neighbors, and the more cooperative behavior built in VSLAs may drive
93

The set of questions about trust and perception are taken from the General Society Survey (GSS) and the
World Values Survey (WVS), which are commonly used in economics research to measure social capital.
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members to be more aware of the duties and responsibilities of community organizations
and demand more out of them.
All other measures of trust in people and institutions such as the police, the
government and financial institutions are not statistically affected by the treatment
interventions.
In terms of general perception I find that those individuals exposed to the publiclabeling treatment are on average 9.6% and 8.4% happier and feel safer in their
neighborhoods, respectively, than those in the control group. But other measures such as
the perception that the family is better off than at baseline and that people are in general
more fair, cooperative or can be trusted is unaffected by the treatment interventions. Private
labeling does not have any effect on any measure of perception (see Panel B).
Another behavior that is evaluated in this essay is whether individuals participate more
or less in a set of decisions within their household such as savings, investments, attend
social events, and different types of expenditures. The results in Panel C show that the
private and public-labeling interventions are ineffective in changing the participation of
individuals in the decision-making within their households during the period of study.
However, the public treatment is significant and increases average participation of VSLA
members in deciding to attend social events by 8.1%.
In Panel D I present the estimations for the variables that represent the reduction in
discretionary spending. After approximately one year of exposure to the public-labeling
treatment, individuals improve overall discretionary spending by about 10 percentage
points. This point estimate is statistically significant at the 10% level. The purchase of
lottery tickets is an expenditure that is affected significantly by private and public treatment
110

interventions. As shown in Panel D, unnecessary or discretionary spending in other items is
unaffected by the treatment status. Lastly, I find no effects of the pro-savings treatment
interventions on changes in food intake for adults or children in the households. Although
this problem is persistent during follow-up, there are no differences across individuals in
the experimental groups.

5.5.

CONCLUSION

This essay describes how two pro-savings interventions stimulate behavioral changes
in various outcomes of individuals that participate in an RCT that took place in nine
villages in Colombia. Members of VSLAs define labels to their VSLA savings account
privately and publicly, creating private and public commitments to themselves and to other
members of the savings groups, respectively.
Using data from household surveys I demonstrate that the treatment interventions have
an effect in some behavioral changes of participants after one year after being exposed to
the interventions. In particular, I find an increase in the level of trust in friends and in the
school system when individuals set up individual or private commitments; an increase in
the level of trust in relatives when the commitment is made public and a reduction in trust
in community organizations. Also, public commitment makes people feel more safe and
happy in their neighborhoods, as well as improving unnecessary or discretionary spending,
especially the purchase of lottery, and in the decisions to attend social events in the family.
But the treatment interventions are statistically silent in changing the participation in the
households’ decision-making. In other words, the bargaining power in the household is
unaffected by treatment status. Similarly, the effect on food security is not significant, not
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as a result of better nutrition, but because the problems of food intake are experienced
similarly across experimental groups.
From a policy perspective, designing interventions able to produce changes in
individual behavior is a powerful tool to improve the wellbeing of individuals. The results
are conservative in explaining the causal relationship between pro-savings interventions
and other behaviors. One question that arises from these findings is why do we care about
people's preferences for consumption? Why do we want to help them save more? This
evidence could be supportive in demonstrating the importance of savings on the decisions
of individuals. However, more data and analysis is necessary to disentangle the mechanism
by which these types of interventions affect the behavioral changes; if it’s through the
change in savings behavior or directly as a result of the interventions.

112

Table 1. OLS regressions of outcome variables on treatment status
Dependent variable:
Close relatives
Other relatives
Friends
VSLA members
Neighbors
Banks and financial institutions
School system
Government
Community organizations
Police
More happy in neighborhood
Feel more safe in neighborhood
Your family is better off than at BL
Think that most people are fair
Think that most people are cooperative
Think that most people can be trusted
Overall decisions
Savings decisions
Attending social events
Regular spending
Other household spending
Expenditures for children
Investment decisions
Improve discretionary spending
Reduction in the spending of:
Lottery
Alcoholic beverages
Grocery shopping
Utilities
Debt
Clothing
Temptation goods
Improved food intake in household
Improved food security of adults
Improved food security of children

Private
Public
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Coef.
Robust SE
Coef.
Robust SE
A. Trust
0.082
(0.130)
0.181
(0.130)
0.384
(0.250)
0.517
(0.211)*
0.543
(0.205)**
0.009
(0.198)
-0.079
(0.150)
-0.03
(0.150)
0.197
(0.269)
-0.163
(0.157)
0.203
(0.177)
-0.074
(0.164)
0.261
(0.148)*
0.174
(0.152)
0.232
(0.140)
0.04
(0.140)
0.167
(0.110)
-0.23
(0.093)*
0.198
(0.150)
-0.008
(0.140)
B. Perception
0.063
(0.040)
0.096
(0.039)*
0.019
(0.040)
0.084
(0.035)*
0.046
(0.060)
0.113
(0.060)
0.005
(0.050)
0.034
(0.050)
0.010
(0.054)
-0.041
(0.047)
-0.011
(0.057)
-0.007
(0.067)
C. More bargaining power in household
0.019
(0.050)
-0.025
(0.050)
0.023
(0.040)
0.045
(0.040)
0.047
(0.040)
0.081
(0.040)*
0.019
(0.030)
0.032
(0.040)
0.009
(0.040)
0.04
(0.040)
0.004
(0.040)
0.039
(0.040)
0.019
(0.030)
0.067
(0.040)
D. Discretionary spending
0.066
(0.040)
0.099
(0.044)*
0.041
0.031
0.039
-0.018
0.059
0.003
0.053
0.061
0.024
-0.003

(0.020)*
0.055
(0.020)
0.019
(0.080)
0.048
(0.050)
-0.017
(0.030)
-0.004
(0.020)
-0.005
(0.030)
0.011
E. Food security
(0.035)
-0.005
(0.033)
-0.031
(0.027)
-0.024

Constant
(5)
Coef.

(6)
Robust SE

(7)
Observations

-0.09
-0.312
-0.307
0.04
-0.180
-0.127
-0.168
-0.09
0.025
-0.062

(0.100)
(0.160)
(0.149)**
(0.100)
(0.101)*
(0.125)
(0.112)
(0.100)
(0.060)
(0.100)

536
188
301
436
187
486
598
434
552
434

0.184
0.145
0.275
0.237
0.186
0.302

(0.035)***
(0.033)***
(0.036)***
(0.033)***
(0.039)***
(0.043)

649
649
649
647
645
649

0.169
0.126
0.111
0.121
0.126
0.135
0.116

(0.037)**
(0.024)**
(0.023)**
(0.024)**
(0.023)**
(0.026)**
(0.024)**

649
651
651
651
651
651
651

0.106

(0.024)**

651

(0.023)*
(0.020)
(0.070)
(0.050)
(0.020)
(0.030)
(0.030)

0.019
0.029
0.454
0.227
0.043
0.048
0.063

(0.009)*
(0.011)**
(0.055)**
(0.036)**
(0.016)**
(0.016)**
(0.019)**

651
651
651
651
651
651
651

(0.033)
(0.031)
(0.022)

0.101
0.097
0.068

(0.022)**
(0.024)**
(0.017)**

651
651
651

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***
significant at 1% level. Outcome variables are listed vertically in each row. The first two columns show the
estimation coefficients and robust standard errors for the private-labeling treatment intervention status;
columns 3 and 4 show coefficients and robust standard errors for the public-labeling treatment intervention
status; columns 5 and 6 show coefficients and robust standard errors for the constant term. The last column
shows the number of observations for each regression.
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Chapter 6
6. CONCLUSION
I designed and implemented a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) to study how two
modifications of a commitment savings product, in which individuals open private or publicly a
‘mental savings account’, affect savings and other decisions of low-income individuals that
participate in VSLAs in Colombia.
The results show that labeling ‘mental savings accounts’ is effective in increasing savings for
different types of individuals. The RCT demonstrates very strong and significant results for treated
individuals in the public-labeling intervention. Savings increased by more than 30 percentage points
(effect size of up to .38 standard deviations) and individuals were at least 8.5% more likely to
achieve the initially established savings goals. The results for the private-labeling treatment
intervention are very interesting also. The effect on savings is heterogeneous and depends on
intrinsic characteristics of individuals and on institutional restrictions imposed by the VSLA
methodology. However, the impact on goal achievement is statistically irrelevant.
The results also provide evidence that treatment effects are very significant for individuals
who save larger amounts of money in the beginning of the VSLA savings cycle; but are
insignificant for individuals with lower savings in the beginning of the cycle. Using a model that
estimates the underlying savings of individuals using an interval regression model and a 2-step
procedure, I show that treatment effects are strong and significant for public-labeling treated
subjects and insignificant for private-labeling subjects. Also, the models shows that the institutional
constraints imposed by the methodology and characteristics of the savings groups affect the savings
decisions of individuals. For that reason, individuals experience different abilities to respond to the
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treatment interventions depending not only on their own behavior but also on the institutional
features of the VSLA program.
In terms of goal achievement, individuals in the public-labeling treatment are more likely to
use other sources of income flows, such as investments and loans to achieve savings goals. This
could be explained by the fear to be punished by other members of the VSLA if they fail to meet
their promises.
Self-help groups such as VSLA are an alternative to poor and extremely poor households to
help them manage financial assets and smooth consumption. Creating commitments exogenously
enable individuals to think about strategies to improve the use of assets and financial decisions in
the future in order to maximize their utility. This intervention translates recent theoretical insights
into experimental strategies implemented in the field to both test the theory and possibly improve
the impacts of a large-scale public policy program. The methodology represents a new approach to
the study of individual behavior and provides valuable insights and information to program
administrators and policy makers involved in the design and diffusion of commitment-savings
products. The increased availability of these and other products with similar features may serve to
increase savings, improve financial literacy amongst poor households, which may contribute to
generate income to fight poverty.

In Chapter 1 I find that VSLA members are individuals that are above or in the upper limit of
the poverty line. Although the target population for the program is poor and extremely poor
households, the self-selection component of the methodology of the program make it hard to
motivate poor and extremely poor individuals to participate in the program.

I compare the situation of these households with what is observe at the national level (total
average, urban and rural averages) using information collected in the first wave of the Colombian
Longitudinal Survey of Wealth, Income, Labor and Land (ELCA) in 2010. In many variables of
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interest, the situation of the VSLA households is comparable with those at the national level. This
information provides a reference point for the readers of the types of households that join a VSLA.

Financial inclusion via informal arrangements may be the first step towards a change in
financial behavior. Practitioners and policy makers should put some attention to designing or
offering innovative products that are consistent with the heterogeneity and the needs of different
types of population. Formal banking is key to helping vulnerable households to manage and
accumulate assets. However, in many cases the existing supply of products and programs is
inconvenient and does not match the demand or at least does not provide enough motivation for
individuals to change their behavior toward savings.

Motivated by the results from the first two chapters and from qualitative analysis, I also
explored how the implementation of pro-savings interventions such as labeling mental accounts
would lead to changes in the behavior and decision-making of participants.

Using data from household surveys I demonstrate that the treatment interventions increase the
level of trust in friends and in the school system when individuals set up individual or private
commitments; an increase in the level of trust in relatives when the commitment is made public and
a reduction in trust in community organizations. Also changed the participant’s perceptions of
happiness and safety in their neighborhoods and led to reductions in discretionary spending.
From a policy perspective, designing these types of interventions may be a powerful tool to
improve the wellbeing of individuals. This evidence is supportive in demonstrating the importance
of savings on the decisions of individuals. However, more data and analysis is necessary to
disentangle the mechanism by which these types of interventions affect the behavioral changes; if
it’s through the change in savings behavior or directly as a result of the interventions.
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